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The groves and thickets of smaller trees are full of blooming evergreen vines.
These vines are not arranged in separate groups, or in delicate wreaths, but 
in bossy walls and heavy, mound-like heaps and banks.  Am made to feel that 
I am now in a strange land. 
John Muir1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Big Thicket National Preserve in eastern Texas became one of America’s 
first national preserves in 1974.2  In a House subcommittee meeting to
establish national protection for this area, a former U.S. Senator from 
Texas stated that the Big Thicket was “for people’s lives to be enriched 
by the wildness and beauty, and the closeness to God and nature.”3  Home 
to thousands of plant and animal species, this national preserve is one of 
the world’s most biologically diverse habitats.4  Given this expansive 
biodiversity, the Big Thicket is often referred to as “an ‘American ark.’”5 
1. JOHN MUIR, A THOUSAND-MILE WALK TO THE GULF 58 (William Frederic Badé 
ed., 1916).
2. See 16 U.S.C. § 698 (2018) (establishing the Big Thicket National Preserve);
The Biological Crossroads of North America, NAT’L PARK SERV. (July 13, 2020), https://
www.nps.gov/bith/learn/nature/index.htm [https://perma.cc/PT9S-LASC] (noting how Big
Thicket was one of the first designated national preserves).
3. Big Thicket National Park, Tex.: Hearing on H.R. 12034 Before the H. Subcomm.
on Nat’l Parks & Recreation of the H. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 92nd Cong. 
15 (1972) (statement of Ralph W. Yarborough, former U.S. Sen.). 
4. See The Biological Crossroads of North America, supra note 2.
 5. Id. 
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References, like these, to God and the Bible are not uncommon in 
Texas.6  Christianity has long played a prominent role in many institutions 
within the state—from the state legislature to the state’s public schools.7 
Texas was centerstage in Van Orden v. Perry, where the Supreme Court 
found that a Ten Commandments inscription on a monument on the Texas 
State Capitol grounds was not a violation of the Establishment Clause.8 
Yet, the Court has not always found religious speech in Texas to be within 
permissible constitutional bounds.  In its seminal case on school prayer,
the Court held that a Texas public school district’s policy that permitted 
“‘student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games’” was violative of
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.9 
Despite the First Amendment Religion Clauses’ original purposes to
protect religious liberty and to prevent division based on religion,10 these 
two examples arising from the interplay of religion and government in
Texas demonstrate how the Establishment Clause has been at the center 
6. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 3101.005 (West 2019) (quoting the state song 
with its refrain “God bless you Texas!  And keep you brave and strong, [¶] That you may 
grow in power and worth, [¶] Thro’out the ages long.”); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.011 
(West 2019) (providing for Bible elective courses in state public schools). 
7. See, e.g., Alexa Ura & Darla Cameron, In Increasingly Diverse Texas, the Legislature 
Remains Mostly White and Male, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://apps.texastribune.org/
features/2019/texas-lawmakers-legislature-demographics/ [https://perma.cc/PT9S-LASC]
(noting that most Texas state legislators practice Christianity); Steven K. Green, Religion
Clause Federalism: State Flexibility Over Religious Matters and the “One-Way Ratchet,” 
56 EMORY L.J. 107, 117 (2006) (providing a personal account of “official school-sponsored
prayer and Bible reading [in Texas public schools] ten years after the Court’s decisions 
striking such practices” (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962))). 
8.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005). 
9. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000). 
10. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The basic purpose
of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote and assure the fullest possible 
scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure 
the best hope of attainment of that end.”); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(stating that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment “seek to avoid that divisiveness 
based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and 
religion alike” (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting))); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (“[P]olitical division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended
to protect.” (citing Paul A. Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. 
L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969))). 
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of some of the Court’s most contentious constitutional litigation.11  These 
acute constitutional controversies also reflect fracturing over the nature of 
establishment jurisprudence.12  Because this area of constitutional law is 
one of endemic complexity,13 some scholars and jurists have labeled it 
incoherent.14  Some scholars have advanced this argument to the point where
they claim that this jurisprudence has absolutely no theory.15  Others have 
deemed it to simply be a mess.16  As a corollary to these labels of mess theory, 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has also been pejoratively labeled a
thicket.17 
11. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3–4 (2005) (discussing how the issue of school prayer is 
enormously divisive); Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of 
Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1038 (2010) (discussing continued division 
over Van Orden).
12. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on 
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 32 (1998) (discussing the fractious and divisive
nature of Establishment Clause litigation).
13. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 
(1980) (“Establishment Clause cases are not easy.”); H. Jefferson Powell, Professor Greenawalt’s 
Unfashionable Idea, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 793 (2015) (deeming modern Establishment 
Clause doctrine complicated and depressing).
14. See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning 
Prohibition. Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 189 (2016) (calling this 
jurisprudence “largely incoherent” (citing Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance 
of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 628 (2011); Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of 
the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006))); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and
Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669, 672–73, 678 (2013) (discussing scholarly arguments 
that assert the “logical incoherence of Establishment Clause incorporation”). 
15. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 109 (1993) (“The embarrassing truth is that the 
Establishment Clause has no theory . . . .”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. 
Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 TEX. L. REV. 577, 578 (1996) (reviewing JESSE 
H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 
THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1995) & STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST 
FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995)) (deeming the Court’s 
religious liberty jurisprudence “relatively theory-free”).
16. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994, 1008 
(2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling this case law “our mess”); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992) (labeling 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence “a mess”).
17. See, e.g., DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 
2001) (framing the case as “requiring [the court] to plunge into the thicket of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence”); Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the 
Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 706 (2008) (framing Establishment Clause litigation as a fight through a 
thicket). 
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Similar pejorative allusions to Establishment Clause jurisprudence have 
resonated in courts and in scholarly dialogues in the school law context.18 
This is likely because the Court’s educational case approaches, like its
other establishment opinions, have appeared to lack uniformity,19 despite
the singular importance of the First Amendment within the K-12 educational 
setting.20  As a result, there has been “widespread judicial recognition of 
the law in this area as [being] ‘the thorniest of constitutional thickets.’”21 
Because the issue of religion in schools is, has always been, and likely 
will long be intensely controversial,22 these school law Establishment Clause 
cases are difficult ones.23  Courts have struggled to decode the complex issues
that arise at the intersection of religion and schools,24 especially when the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area seems opaque and 
incomprehensible.25  Contrary to this perception, though, this Article 
18. See Workman v. Greenwood Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:10-CV-0293-SEB-
TAB, 2010 WL 1780043, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2010) (“The issues implicated by 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment often constitute themselves as an 
analytical thicket, waiting to ensnare federal courts . . . in significant, if touchy, ideological 
issues . . . .” (citing McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 890 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting))); James A. Davids, Putting Faith in Prison Programs, and Its 
Constitutionality Under Thomas Jefferson’s Faith-Based Initiative, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
341, 387 n. 229 (2008) (characterizing circuit courts as “shudder[ing] upon entry into the 
Establishment Clause thicket” with school law cases). 
19. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 
(1980) (highlighting the lack of a “litmus-paper test” in the Court’s educational Establishment
Clause cases).
20. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (noting the particular
vigilance of the Court in deciding educational Establishment Clause cases given the special 
context of K-12 schools); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1968) (discussing 
the importance of the Court’s Establishment Clause K-12 school law jurisprudence). 
21. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 380 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Peck ex rel. 
Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 620 (2d Cir. 2005)).
22. See Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent 
School District, 90 KY. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (discussing the enduring controversy of religion in 
public schools).
23. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584 (1992) (acknowledging the difficulty
of school law Establishment Clause analysis); Eric J. Segall, Parochial School Aid 
Revisited: The Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test and Religious Liberty, 28 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 263, 264 (1991) (discussing the difficulty of school law Establishment Clause cases). 
24. See Tobias G. Fenton, Note, The Need to Revive the Role of Legislative Purpose 
in Establishment Clause Cases, 83 B.U. L. REV. 647, 658 (2003) (discussing lower courts’ 
confusion in interpreting the Court’s Establishment Clause case law).
25. See R. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 147, 177–78 (1993) (arguing that the Court has been inconsistent in its 
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asserts that a certain subset of this jurisprudence—the Court’s precedent
on religious activities within public schools—is not an incoherent morass 
of a mess or an impenetrable, incomprehensible thicket.26  By sorting through 
this “irreducibly intricate,” but comprehensible, case law,27 this Article 
instead argues that it is unified by its fidelity to Framer James Madison’s
conception of neutrality, which was first articulated in Everson v. Board of 
Education, the school law case that began the Court’s modern Establishment 
Clause doctrine.28  Given Madison’s preeminence in framing and ensuring 
passage of the Bill of Rights,29 the Court’s fidelity to Madisonian neutrality 
properly embodies the original purposes of the Establishment Clause to 
protect religious minorities against religious coercion, to secure conscientious
liberties of the people, and to preserve the sanctity of the spheres of church 
and state.30 
school law Establishment Clause cases and has produced unreconcilable case law in doing 
so); Mark Strasser, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Illusory Safeguards Against Funding 
Pervasively Sectarian Institutions of Higher Learning, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 353, 353 (2008) 
(discussing how the Court’s seemingly unreconcilable school law Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence provides “no coherent guidance” to lower courts). 
26. Contra LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1264 (2d ed. 
1988) (“[I]t seems impossible to divine a coherent set of principles to explain [Establishment 
Clause cases.]”); Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 561 (10th
Cir. 1997) (discussing the “morass of inconsistent Establishment Clause decisions”). 
27. Nelson Tebbe, Eclecticism, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 317, 317 (2008) (citing KENT 
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS (2006);
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 
(2008)).
28. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (discussing this neutrality
requirement); David E. Steinberg, The Myth of Church-State Separation, 59 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 623, 638 (2011) (stating that the Court “laid the foundation of modern Establishment 
Clause doctrine” in Everson).
29. The Founding Fathers: Virginia, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/
founding-docs/founding-fathers-virginia#madison [https://perma.cc/LXR3-RHEH] (discussing
Madison’s preeminent role in the creation and passage of the Bill of Rights). 
30. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious 
Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1574 (2010) (identifying “religious liberty and equality
for all” as “the goals of the Establishment Clause”); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of 
the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 351 (2002) (“Liberty of conscience, 
then, was . . . the purpose that underlay the Establishment Clause when it was enacted.”);
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 
STAN.L. REV. 233, 322 (1989) (arguing that the Establishment Clause ensured that “[g]overnment 
intrusion may not corrupt religious groups, but neither may religious groups wield 
excessive power over societal policy” (citing Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 
123, 127 (1982); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); Everson, 
330 U.S. at 15–16; Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1056, 1058 (1978))). 
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Through the identification of this fidelity within this subset of school
law, this Article reclaims the thicket theory pejoration as a constitutionally 
correct and significantly beneficial theory that embodies the original 
purposes of the Framers in their adoption of the First Amendment.31  In 
doing so, this Article demonstrates that the Court’s educational Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has formed a protective thicket around American
schoolchildren—a political minority that merits special constitutional 
shielding from the divisive forces of state-established religion.32  It is a 
positive thicket that safeguards the freedom of conscience of all American
schoolchildren, no matter their beliefs, while balancing respect for their 
autonomy to engage in constitutionally protected religious practices. Finally,
it is an instructional thicket that upholds democratic principles by preserving
respect for both government and religion. These educative results align
with the Court’s recognized importance of the public school as the preparatory
situs for children’s participation in our constitutional democracy.33 
Consequently, the Court should continue to employ this consistent approach
to preserve the civics lessons regarding the Establishment Clause that should 
be imparted daily inside and outside America’s public schools. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF EDUCATION LAW ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion[.]”34 Although it is only comprised of these “few words,”35 this 
31. See Amanda Harmon Cooley, Justiciability and Judicial Fiat in Establishment 
Clause Cases Involving Religious Speech of Students, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 911, 915 
(2020) (discussing the pejorative references to Establishment Clause jurisprudence as 
being thicket theory).
32. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98, 104–05 (1968) (noting that vigilant 
protection of schoolchildren is required in school law Establishment Clause cases); Bill 
W. Sanford, Jr., Separation v. Patriotism: Expelling the Pledge from School, 34 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 461, 494 (2003) (“The Court maintains vigilant guard over schoolchildren
regarding state-sponsored religious activity.”).
33. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (“The importance of public 
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the 
preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our 
decisions . . . .”).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
35.  Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983). 
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clause governs a broad spectrum of activity.36  The Establishment Clause 
applies to all federal and state governmental action.37  This includes legislation,
speech, and all other official conduct.38 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is complex and often divisive.39 
There is concentrated dissension about the original intent of the Founders 
regarding the central meaning of this First Amendment Clause.40  Because 
this area of constitutional litigation has arisen in a multitude of different 
cases,41 the Court has utilized a variety of divergent analyses.42  The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged the inherent tension of this jurisprudence by
situating it in a Janusian positionality, wherein the one side that recognizes 
the past of America’s religious heritage must be balanced by the other side 
that calls for a Jeffersonian “separation between church and state.”43  In a 
sense, the labyrinthine collection of Establishment Clause cases is an 
appropriate reflection of America’s “modern, complex society, whose 
36. See Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 477, 486 (1991) (discussing the Court’s broad determination as to the scope of the 
Establishment Clause).
37. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment
Clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Abington 
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (reaffirming Establishment Clause
incorporation); Richard C. Mason, School Choice and the Establishment Clause: Theories 
of “Constitutional Legal Cause,” 96 DICK. L. REV. 629, 644–46 (1992) (discussing the
individual freedoms protected from state action by the Establishment Clause’s incorporation). 
38. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“[G]overnment
speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
678 (1984) (stating the Establishment Clause applies to “challenged legislation or official 
[government] conduct”).
39. See Nicholas P. Cafardi, The Future of the Establishment Clause in Context: 
Neutrality, Religion, or Avoidance?, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 711 (2012) (discussing the 
complexity of Establishment Clause analysis); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 3– 
4 (discussing the deep societal division driven by “the role of religion in government”). 
40. See Stephanie H. Barclay, Brady Earley & Annika Boone, Original Meaning 
and the Establishment Clause: A Corpus Linguistics Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 518– 
21 (2019) (discussing the scholarly divide over the Establishment Clause’s meaning). 
41. See Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad 
Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 490 (2004) 
(explaining that the Court has applied the Establishment Clause to a “myriad of factual 
contexts”).
42. See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, 
the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 
1097, 1097 (2006) (discussing the “divergent interpretations of the Establishment Clause”); 
William M. Janssen, Led Blindly: One Circuit’s Struggle to Faithfully Apply the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Religious Symbols Constitutional Analysis, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 33, 47–50 (2013) 
(cataloguing the Court’s establishment tests). 
43.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005). 
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traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity 
and pluralism in all areas.”44 
School law has been an area of key importance in the evolution of the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.45  The core values of the clause 
are vital in public schools, given state compulsory attendance laws and the 
impressionability of schoolchildren.46  In 1947, the Court provided its first 
extended substantive examination of the Establishment Clause in an education 
law case,47 Everson v. Board of Education.48  The Court’s first invalidation 
of a state practice under that clause took place only one year later, in another 
education law case, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education.49 
Although these cases both employed the Jeffersonian wall of separation
principle and a neutrality approach,50 uniformity in the Court’s initial 
Establishment Clause methodology was seemingly abandoned with the 
introduction of a variety of tests to gauge the constitutionality of religious
practices within the schoolhouse gate.51 
44.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). 
45. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772
(1973) (noting how most of the Court’s “Establishment Clause questions have involved
the relationship between religion and education”).
46. See Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Schools? A Discussion of Religion’s 
Role in the Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 634 (1995) (arguing the special 
importance of Establishment Clause values in public schools due to “compulsory education 
laws and the students’ relative immaturity”).
47. See David E. Steinberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Establishment Clause Federalism, 
40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 309 (2013) (labeling Everson “the foundation of modern 
Establishment Clause doctrine”).
48. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment 
Clause against the states).
49. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948). 
50. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (“[T]he clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’” (quoting Reynolds 
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878))); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211 (finding an 
Establishment Clause violation based on the state action not complying with the “wall of 
separation between Church and State” (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16)). 
51. See Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1621, 1627–30, 1632 (2006) (highlighting the Court’s multiple educational
Establishment Clause tests). 
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In addition to the maligned Lemon v. Kurtzman purpose, primary effect, 
and entanglement test,52 and its precursor purpose and primary effect test,53 
the Court has used neutrality analyses,54 a coercion analysis,55 a historical 
approach and a rejected historical approach,56 a viewpoint equality test,57 
52. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); see also Santa Fe Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314–15 (2000) (applying the Lemon test in a school law 
Establishment Clause case); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23, 232 (1997) (same); 
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
(same); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583, 597 (1987) (same); Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 55 56 (1985) (same); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 
(1985) (same), overruled in part on other grounds by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409–10 (1985) (same); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 
388, 394 (1983) (same); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980) (per curiam) (same); 
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980) (same); 
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772–73 (1973)
(identifying the Lemon test as the test required to pass constitutional muster under the
Establishment Clause); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 829–30 (1973) (applying Lemon 
test); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480–81 (1973) 
(same); Steven K. Green, The “Irrelevance” of Church-State Separation in the Twenty-
First Century, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 53–54 (2019) (discussing judicial criticism of the 
Lemon test); Claudia E. Haupt, Active Symbols, 55 B.C. L. REV. 821, 828 n.37 (2014) 
(same).
53. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (stating that
governmental action violates the Establishment Clause “if either [the purpose or the primary 
effect of the government action] is the advancement or inhibition of religion”); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (applying Schempp purpose and primary effect 
test); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (affirming the purpose and primary 
effect test).
54. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (applying a neutrality 
approach); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion) (same); Santa 
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 307, 313 (same); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 
533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001) (same); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704–05 (1994)
(same); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (same); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (same); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60 (same); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 
103–04 (same); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (same); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1962)
(same); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (same); Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 
(same).
55. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115 (applying a coercion analysis); Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 310–13 (same); Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (same); Edwards, 482 
U.S. at 583–84 (emphasizing the coercive environment of public schools); Engel, 370 U.S. 
at 430–31 (emphasizing the coercive pressure of government-supported religious conformity);
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311–12 (applying a coercion analysis). 
56. Compare Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 (finding an Establishment Clause violation for 
school prayer based on the colonial history of seeking religious freedom in America), with 
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583 n.4 (rejecting a historical approach for school law Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence due to the virtual nonexistence of free public schools at the time of 
the Constitution’s adoption).
57. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102, 107 (finding that an exclusion of a 
religious student club from a school was not required by the Establishment Clause, but 
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a private choice theory,58 and an endorsement test59 in its range of school 
law Establishment Clause cases.  It should be no surprise then that scholarly 
perspectives on this jurisprudence have been conflicted and fractured.60 
This area of law also has been criticized by every part of the Court’s 
ideological spectrum.  Justice Rehnquist asserted that this doctrine is “neither
principled nor unified.”61  Justice Scalia deemed it a “geometry of crooked
lines and wavering shapes.”62  Justice Souter has stated this jurisprudence 
is in “doctrinal bankruptcy.”63  Justice Stevens described analyzing this 
area of the law as a “sisyphean task.”64  The net result of all of this division 
is a goliath of case law, which has been deemed to be a thorny thicket. 
III. FIDELITY TO MADISONIAN NEUTRALITY IN EDUCATION LAW 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES INVOLVING RELIGIOUS 
ACTIVITIES WITHIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
School law has been a central focal point of the Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.65  However, the Supreme Court has consistently 
struggled with this area of its Establishment Clause doctrine.66  The general 
instead was viewpoint discrimination that violated the free speech clause); Lamb’s Chapel
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (rejecting an Establishment 
Clause defense through a viewpoint equality analysis); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248–49 
(applying Lemon through a viewpoint equality lens). 
58. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (applying private choice 
theory); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 9, 12 (same). 
59. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 118 (using an endorsement test for a school 
law Establishment Clause case); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) 
(stating the Establishment Clause is violated by “a message of government endorsement 
or disapproval of religion”), overruled on other grounds by Agostini, 521 U.S. 203. 
60. See Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal 
Development Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516 (1968)
(describing the impossibility of finding unified scholarly agreement on the Establishment
Clause’s core principles).
61.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
62. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
63.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 688 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
64. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65. See Marion K. McDonald, Note, Establishment Clause Challenge to Mandatory 
Religious Accommodation in the Workplace, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 121, 121 (1984) (discussing
how most of the Court’s Establishment Clause cases have been school law cases).
66. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting the 
Court’s consistent struggle in Establishment Clause interpretation). 
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confusion in this area has been exacerbated by the variety of the Court’s
religion and education precedents.  There are four major categories of these
cases: 1) cases involving religious activities within the public schools;67 
2) cases involving varying forms of governmental assistance to nonpublic 
sectarian religious schools;68 3) equal access cases;69 and 4) standing and 
justiciability requirements cases.70 
A first—or second or tenth—look at these categories altogether reveals 
an apparently incomprehensible area of case law.71  The Court explicitly
recognized that it has “isolated no single test of constitutional sufficiency” 
for this area of decision-making.72  Although uniformity in doctrine is not
readily apparent throughout the Court’s entire school law Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence,73 one of its subcategories has had a consistent application
of constitutional analysis—those cases dealing with religious activities 
within public schools. 
The Court has been consistent in analyzing cases dealing with religious
activities in public schools, unlike its acknowledged sea changes in its 
67. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772
(1973) (identifying this area as one area of the Court’s “religion-education precedents”). 
68. See id. (identifying this area as another area of the Court’s “religion-education 
precedents”).
69. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (evaluating 
the Establishment Clause in a school law equal access case); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387, 401 (1993) (same); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 231, 247 (1990) (plurality opinion) (same). 
70. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 130 (2011)
(discussing taxpayer standing in a school law Establishment Clause case); Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–13, 15, 17–18 (2004), (discussing prudential 
standing in an Establishment Clause school law case), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81
(1987) (providing the jurisdictional requirements for an Establishment Clause school law 
case); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 534–35, 541–49 (1986)
(discussing the standing requirements for an Establishment Clause school law case); 
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 426 (1974) (discussing the ripeness requirements for a 
school law Establishment Clause case); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91–106 (1968) 
(providing the requirements for taxpayer standing in a school law Establishment Clause 
case); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432–36 (1952) (same). 
71. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 227 (2008) (describing Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
as hard to comprehend). 
72.  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 869 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
73. Compare Haupt, supra note 52, at 828 (noting that Lemon remains the 
constitutional touchstone for Establishment Clause analysis), with Martha Minow, Choice 
or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE 
L.J. 493, 512 n.57 (1999) (discussing the “Court’s tendency to ignore Lemon”). 
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analysis of government aid to nonpublic sectarian schools.74  The Supreme
Court’s line of cases in this former category has maintained fidelity with 
Everson, the case that established modern Establishment Clause doctrine.75 
Specifically, this unified approach has modeled and applied the Madisonian
neutrality at the heart of the Court’s decision in Everson.  In doing so, the 
Court has incorporated the tenets of the preeminent Framer’s conception 
of neutrality,76 whereby the state cannot operate to inhibit or aid religion. 
This fidelity to Madison’s articulations of neutrality reflects the original 
purposes of the Establishment Clause to secure religious and conscientious
liberties of all the people and to preserve both sides of the Jeffersonian
wall.77 
In these precedents, the Court has repeatedly upheld “an ideal principle 
of democratic government,”78 resulting in almost seventy-five years of
appropriate stare decisis in public school and religious activities cases.79 
This fidelity to Madison’s intent is the correct constitutional course, as it 
properly provides the equipoise of neutrality between aiding and inhibiting 
religion that was intended by the Establishment Clause.80  Consequently,
the balance between religious liberty and freedom of conscience has been
positively preserved by the Court’s incorporation of Everson’s articulation 
of Madisonian neutrality in this school law Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  The remainder of this section will demonstrate the fidelity 
74. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23, 235 (1997) (acknowledging the 
Court’s breaking with stare decisis by its different jurisprudential approaches to school law 
government assistance Establishment Clause cases). 
75. See John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 94 (1986) (“Modern Establishment Clause doctrine” originated 
with Everson.).
76. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Opportunistic Originalism and the Establishment 
Clause, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 648 (2019) (noting Madison’s preeminent role 
as a Framer).
77. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment 
Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 673 (2002) (stating that the Everson Court “correctly 
identified protection of religious liberty as the central goal of the [Establishment] Clause”).
78. Giannella, supra note 60, at 516 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)) (characterizing the Madisonian interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause’s original objective).
79. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. 
80. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 883 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing
the required equipoise in the Everson notion of neutrality). 
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at the heart of this theory through a comprehensive chronology of these 
cases. 
A. Everson v. Board of Education 
Over 150 years after the Establishment Clause’s ratification,81 the Court 
conducted its first substantive examination of that clause in Everson.82  As 
a result, Everson is considered the starting point of the Court’s modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.83  In  Everson, the Court examined 
the constitutionality of a township board of education’s reimbursement of 
parents for the transportation costs to bus their children to private Catholic 
parochial schools.84  This reimbursement was authorized by a New Jersey
statute that allowed “local school districts to make rules and contracts for 
the transportation of children to and from schools.”85 
At the outset of its analysis, the Court incorporated the Establishment 
Clause via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause’s protection 
of personal liberty.86  This was the first time the Court had expressly
incorporated this clause to apply to state and local governments,87 and this 
“quiet revolution” incorporation remains firmly rooted in the Court’s 
jurisprudence.88  In Everson, the Court found that the interrelation of the 
81. See Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 
82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (1988) (noting the lag between the ratification of the 
Establishment Clause and the Supreme Court’s first extended examination of it in 
Everson).
82. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 1. 
83. See Steven K. Green, Locke v. Davey and the Limits to Neutrality Theory, 77 
TEMP. L. REV. 913, 914 (2004) (deeming Everson “the first modern Establishment Clause 
case”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 284 (2001) (“The modern Establishment Clause dates from 
Everson . . . .”). 
84. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 8 (“The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth . . . commands that a state ‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .’” (citation omitted) (first citing 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); then quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) ); see 
also Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment 
Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 599 n.457 (discussing Everson’s application of
“the Establishment Clause through the ‘liberty’ provision in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment” (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 14–15)). 
87. See Esbeck, supra note 86, at 530 n.173 (noting the Court’s first incorporation 
of the Establishment Clause as “a restraint on state and local governments” in Everson).
88. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1985) (emphasizing “how firmly 
embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have 
no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment 
14 
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First Amendment Religion Clauses provided “every reason” to extend its
previous incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause to the Establishment 
Clause as well.89  Consequently, the Court determined that parallel federal 
and state actions could violate the constitutional prohibition against 
establishment.90 
Throughout Everson, the Court emphasized and incorporated two of the
Framers’ conceptions of liberty and neutrality—that of Jefferson and 
Madison.91  After first quoting the Establishment Clause, the Court noted
that “[t]hese words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early 
Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which they
fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves
and for their posterity.”92  From there, the Court provided a broad-brush
history of the country’s first settlers who “came here from Europe to 
escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend 
government-favored churches.”93  The Court emphasized the religious 
persecution of the old world, as well as the transplantation of some of 
these practices in the new America.94  Abhorrence of these practices “found 
expression in the First Amendment.”95 
The Court specifically recounted Jefferson and Madison’s fight against 
Virginia’s attempt in 1785 and 1786 to levy taxes to support a state church.96 
The Court cited to Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
than does the Congress of the United States” in a school law Establishment Clause case); 
Dan T. Coenen, Quiet-Revolution Rulings in Constitutional Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2061, 
2069–70 (2019) (labeling the incorporation of the Establishment Clause a “quiet revolution”).
89. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
90. See id. at 15–16 (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither 
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against 
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance.  No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt 
to teach or practice religion.  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”).
91. See id. at 8.
 92. Id.
 93. Id.
 94. See id. at 9.
 95. Id. at 11. 
96. See id. at 11–12. 
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Religious Assessments, stating that Madison “eloquently argued that a true 
religion did not need the support of law; . . . that the best interest of a 
society required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that
cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-established
religions.”97  The Court also quoted the preamble to the Virginia Bill for
Religious Liberty that was originally authored by Thomas Jefferson: 
“‘Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence 
it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend
only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness . . . .’”98 
Consequently, the incorporation analysis relied heavily upon American
colonial history and Madison and Jefferson’s writings on church and state, 
with their shared vision of the need “to provide . . . protection against 
governmental intrusion on religious liberty.”99  The Court emphasized that 
it was this same objective that was realized in the drafting of the First 
Amendment.100  In incorporating this Framers’ ideology,101 the Court 
cemented its analysis in Jefferson’s words that “the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation 
between church and State.’”102 
In evaluating the New Jersey statute, the Court found no breach of
this “high and impregnable” wall,103 by balancing the provisions of
the Establishment Clause with the Free Exercise Clause.104  This balance 
exemplified the Court’s properly neutral approach to this school law case. 
Here, the Court found that a state contribution of “tax-raised funds to the 
support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church” 
violates the Establishment Clause.105  However, the Court balanced this 
finding by stating that “other language of the amendment commands that 
[a state] cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.”106 
97. Id. at 12. 
98. Id. at 12–13 (quoting Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, 12 Henning Statutes 
of Virginia, 84 (1823)). 
99. Id. at 11–13. 
100. See id. at 13.
 101. See Steven K. Green, A “Spacious Conception”: Separationism as an Idea, 85 
OR. L. REV. 443, 443 (2006) (discussing how Jeffersonian separation became “constitutional 
canon” with Everson).
102. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 
(1878)).
103. Id. at 18. 
104. See id. at 16.
 105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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This balancing approach directly implemented Madison’s conceptions 
of neutrality as reflected in his Memorial and Remonstrance, his other 
writings, and his congressional remarks in introducing and debating the
passage of the Bill of Rights.107  This Madisonian principle “requires the
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and 
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.”108  The 
Everson Court implemented the Madisonian approach with this neutrality 
analysis, stating clearly that “State power is no more to be used so as to
[inhibit] religions than it is to favor them.”109  Using these standards, the 
Court concluded that the Establishment Clause did not bar the state “from 
spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils 
as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending 
public and other schools.”110 
Everson did not analyze the constitutionality of religious activities within
public schools.111  However, it was the first school law Establishment Clause 
case, the first case to incorporate the Establishment Clause to state action, 
and the origin of the Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.112 
Therefore, the Court’s implementation of Madisonian neutrality in Everson 
should be the touchstone for all of the Court’s school law Establishment 
Clause cases.  That has not proved to be the case for each of the Court’s
religion-education precedents.  However, in every school law Establishment 
Clause case that has examined the constitutionality of religious practices 
in public schools after Everson, the Court has acted in accordance with 
this Madisonian conception of neutrality, whereby the state cannot 
107. See id. at 12–13, 18. 
108. Id.
 109. Id.
 110. Id. at 17. 
111. See Mark J. Chadsey, State Aid to Religious Schools: From Everson to Zelman: 
A Critical Review, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 718 (2004) (discussing Everson as a state 
aid to religious schools case); David K. DeWolf, State Action Under the Religion Clauses: 
Neutral in Result or Neutral in Treatment?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 253, 279 (1990) (same). 
112. See Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as A Factor 
in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 390 (1989) 
(characterizing Everson “as the starting point” for modern Establishment Clause analysis); 
Mark Strasser, Repudiating Everson: On Buses, Books, and Teaching Articles of Faith, 78 
MISS. L.J. 567, 570 (2009) (“Everson [requires] close attention . . . because it was the first 
case in modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence . . . .” (citing Tracey L. Meares & 
Kelsi Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1315, 1363 
(2007))). 
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constitutionally act to aid or inhibit religion.  This fidelity throughout these
subsequent cases correctly follows stare decisis; it also provides the foundation 
for each of these decisions’ constitutionally correct holdings that the 
challenged religious practices in public schools violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
B.  Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education 
One year after Everson, the Court invalidated a law under the Establishment 
Clause for the first time in McCollum.113  Here, the Court used an application 
of the Jeffersonian separation principle, as well as an acknowledgment of
the necessary neutrality demanded by the clause.114  In this case, the 
challenged state action was the provision of thirty minutes of weekly
religious education in the public schools by religious teachers employed 
by private religious groups in a state with compulsory education laws.115 
Students who opted out of the religious instruction “were required to leave
their classrooms and go to some other place in the school building for pursuit 
of their secular studies.”116 The parent of one of these students filed the
lawsuit, claiming that this was an Establishment Clause violation.117 
In its decision, the Court found an impermissible intertwinement of the 
state and religion that breached the “wall of separation” “between Church 
and State[,]”118 which was an integral part of the Everson analysis.119  The 
Court also incorporated the Everson Madisonian neutrality principle, with 
its balancing between the Religion Clauses, into its analysis of the challenged 
state action: 
To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
utilize its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the 
dissemination of their doctrines and ideals does not, as counsel urge, manifest a 
governmental hostility to religion or religious teachings.  A manifestation of such 
hostility would be at war with our national tradition as embodied in the First
Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise of religion.  For the First Amendment 
113. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209–12 (1948). 
114. See id. at 211–12; see also Stephanie L. Shemin, The Potential Constitutionality 
of Intelligent Design?, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 621, 652 (2005) (discussing how McCollum 
made clear that the government must “maintain a neutral stance toward religion”). 
115. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205. 
116. Id. at 209. 
117. Id. at 205. 
118. Id. at 231. 
119. See Mark Strasser, Religion in the Schools: On Prayer, Neutrality, and Sectarian 
Perspectives, 42 AKRON L. REV. 185, 204 (2009) (discussing the reliance of both cases on
“the impregnable wall between Church and State”). 
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rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.120 
Consequently, the Court held that this public school action violated the 
Establishment Clause, as incorporated to the states, because it was “beyond 
all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public
school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith.”121  Therefore, 
the Court properly held this public school religious instruction was a 
violation of Madisonian neutrality and of the Constitution. 
C. Engel v. Vitale 
The Court’s next case about religious practices in public schools was 
Engel v. Vitale in 1962.122  In this case, the Court incorporated the Everson 
notions of Jeffersonian separation and Madisonian neutrality into its first
examination of the constitutionality of school prayer.123  Here, students in 
New York were directed by their school board to recite this prayer in their 
classrooms to start each school day: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, 
our teachers and our Country.”124  The prayer was authored and recommended 
by state officials as part of a “Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training 
in the Schools.”125 
The parents of ten schoolchildren challenged the constitutionality of the 
prayer practice, claiming that it was inconsistent with “the beliefs, religions, 
or religious practices of both themselves and their children” and, therefore,
was a violation of the Establishment Clause.126  In evaluating this challenge, 
the Court determined that the “program of daily classroom invocation of 
God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a religious activity 
[because i]t is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for the 
120. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211–12. 
121. Id. at 210. 
122.  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
123. See id. at 431–32 (citing JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance against 
Religious Assessments, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 187, 190 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1901)); see also Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial 
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2093 (1996) (discussing the primacy of Engel as a school 
prayer case).
124. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. 
125. Id. at 423. 
126. Id. 
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blessings of the Almighty.”127  The Court further found that “the fact that 
the program . . . does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits 
those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room, 
ignores the essential nature of the program’s constitutional defects.”128 
The Court then applied the Jeffersonian constitutional standard from 
Everson.129  In doing so, it determined that the school invocation practice
“breache[d] the constitutional wall of separation between Church and 
State” because the Establishment Clause “must at least mean that in this 
country it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a 
religious program carried on by government.”130  The Court rooted this 
finding in American colonial history as “this very practice of establishing
governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the 
reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England and
131 seek religious freedom in America.”
The same notions of Madisonian neutrality that had been incorporated 
in its predecessor cases were also applied in Engel,132 with an articulation 
of the importance of the Establishment Clause in preserving the sanctity 
of religion and government.133  The analysis expanded upon its existing
neutrality notions by finding that nonsectarian, nondenominational, or 
noncompulsory religious practices, like this prayer, do not achieve the 
constitutional balance required by the Establishment Clause.134  Continuing
its neutrality analysis, the Court rejected any notion that its decision reflected 
any religious hostility.135  Instead, citing Madison, the Court emphasized 
Madison’s intent for the Establishment Clause to preserve the separate spheres 
of religion and government as that clause’s “first and most immediate 
purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends 
to destroy government and to degrade religion.”136 
Finally, the Court emphasized the coercion inherent in these types of
governmental prayer practices, which supplemented the neutrality analysis 
127. Id. at 424. 
128. Id. at 430. 
129. See id. at 425. 
130. Id.
 131. Id.
 132. See id. at 431–32 (citing MADISON, supra note 123, at 187, 190). 
133. See id. at 430–31. 
134. See id. at 430 (“Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral 
nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it 
from the limitations of the Establishment Clause . . . .”). 
135. See id. at 433–34. 
136. Id. at 431–32. 
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thrust of the decision: “When the power, prestige and financial support of 
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect 
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing 
officially approved religion is plain.”137  This coercive pressure acted as a 
final tipping point for the required neutrality balance.  Consequently, the 
Court determined that the school prayer violated the “purposes of the 
Establishment Clause and . . . the Establishment Clause itself.”138 
D. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp 
One year after Engel, the Court formalized its adherence to Madisonian 
neutrality in school religious activities through an express test for this area 
of Establishment Clause analysis in School District of Abington Township 
v. Schempp.139  In these companion cases, the Court examined a Pennsylvania
statute that required a ten-verse reading from the Bible at the opening of
each public school day with a provision that excused children from the 
reading with parental or guardian written permission.140  It also evaluated 
a similar Baltimore rule that required a reading from the Bible or of the
Lord’s Prayer for opening school exercises in the city’s public schools.141 
In practice, the Pennsylvania schools either 1) would have students read
the ten Bible verses over the intercom system, which would be followed
by a recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, during which students were asked to
stand and join in the prayer or 2) would have the homeroom teacher conduct
the Bible reading, followed by a standing recitation of the Lord’s Prayer 
by the class.142  The Pennsylvania statute provided that participation in
these exercises was voluntary.143  However, some parents, including the
litigants, did not opt their children out of these exercises, as they believed
that their “children’s relationships with their teachers and classmates would 
be adversely affected.”144  Originally, the Baltimore rule did not permit
children to be excused from the opening religious exercises at the schools.145 
137. Id.
 138. Id. at 433. 
139.  374 U.S. 203, 203, 214, 222 (1963). 
140. See id. at 205. 
141. See id. at 211. 
142. Id. at 207–08. 
143. Id. at 207. 
144. Id. at 208. 
145. See id. at 211–10. 
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However, this rule was amended to allow student nonparticipation after 
parental requests for such an amendment.146  Schoolchildren and their 
parents brought suit, claiming Establishment Clause violations.147 
In the opinion, after recognizing the vital connections between religion
and American history,148 the Court applied a Madisonian neutrality analysis,149 
with a balance between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.150 
The Court provided explicit connections between each religion clause and 
the precedent of neutrality that it had applied throughout its school law 
jurisprudence.151  On one side of the balance, the Court found that “[t]he
wholesome ‘neutrality’” of its religion-education precedents reflects the 
lessons of “history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion 
of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one 
upon the other to the end that official support of the . . . Government 
would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.”152  The 
Court determined that the Establishment Clause prohibits this fusion or 
concerted dependency.153  On the other side of the balance, the Court found 
that the Free Exercise Clause provided another reason for the Court’s 
application of Madisonian neutrality: that clause “recognizes the value of
religious training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right 
of every person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, 
154 free of any compulsion from the state.”
These guiding considerations that justified the Court’s past fidelity to 
Madisonian neutrality, and that affirmed the Court’s continued stare decisis 
with this principle, gave rise to an express test.155 Here, the Court formalized 
its neutrality precedent by stating a test that evaluates “the purpose and
the primary effect” of the government action.156  The Court determined 
that “[i]f either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the 
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the 
Constitution.”157  Therefore, to comply with the Establishment Clause, the 
146. See id. at 211–12. 
147. Id. at 206, 211. 
148. See id. at 212–13. 
149. See id. at 214 (emphasizing Madison’s balance of neutrality that was incorporated 
into the Constitution).
150. See id. at 222. 
151. Id.




 156. Id. 
157. Id. 
22 
[VOL. 58:  1, 2021]  Framers’ Fidelity and Thicket Theory 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Court held that “there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”158 
In applying this test to the Pennsylvania and Baltimore required school
religious exercises, the Court correctly determined that the Bible reading 
and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer were violations of the Establishment 
Clause and the First Amendment’s requirement “that the Government
maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion.”159  The 
Court cemented its holding through a further refinement of the nature of
constitutional neutrality in school religion cases: 
Finally, we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit 
a State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those
affected, collides with the majority’s right to free exercise of religion. While the Free 
Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free 
exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of
the State to practice its beliefs.160 
Like Engel, the Court incorporated the perils of state coercion and the
protection of religion into its neutrality discussion.161 This Court found 
that the parental opt-out provisions afforded no more insulation from an
Establishment Clause violation than did the noncompulsory nature of the
school prayer of Engel.162  Further, the Court expressly cited Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance in rejecting any claim that these school
religious exercises were “relatively minor encroachments on the First
Amendment” and, therefore, were constitutional.163  The Court cautioned 
that “[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too 
soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, ‘it is proper 
to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.’”164  The Court was 
intentional in its incorporation of Madisonian neutrality references and
deliberately emphasized the incorporation of Madison’s views into the 
158. Id. (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
159. Id. at 225. 
160. Id. at 225–26. 
161. See supra text accompanying note 137. 
162. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224–25. 
163. Id. at 225. 
164. Id. (quoting MADISON, supra note 123, at 185). 
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Constitution.165  Finally, the Court urged that its finding was not a decision
that resulted in “a ‘religion of secularism’” or hostility towards religion.166 
Instead, the holding ensured the protection of religion from harmful 
governmental invasion.167  To achieve this aim, the Court succinctly reaffirmed
its fidelity to this Framer’s neutrality, stating: “In the relationship between
man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.”168 
E. Epperson v. Arkansas 
The Court continued to apply Madisonian neutrality, through the expressly 
articulated Schempp purpose and primary effect test, in its next religious 
activities in public schools case.  This took place in the 1968 invalidation 
of an antievolution teaching law under the Establishment Clause in 
Epperson v. Arkansas.169  Here, the Court found that the Arkansas statute 
could not “be defended as an act of religious neutrality”170 and was a plain 
violation of the Establishment Clause.171  The Court’s legal conclusion
was based on the state law’s exclusion of evolution from the public school 
curriculum “for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a 
particular religious doctrine [and] with a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.”172 
In coming to this conclusion, the Court solidified what it deemed to be
fundamental freedom antecedents for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.173 
Its first antecedent reflected the Court’s Madisonian neutrality principle 
for this First Amendment analysis: 
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of 
religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may not be hostile to any religion or to
the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.174 
165. See id.; Richard Albert, Beyond the Conventional Establishment Clause Narrative, 
28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 329, 374 (2005) (discussing the great care the Court took in emphasizing
the incorporation of Madison’s views on religious liberty into the Constitution). 
166. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (citing Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). 
167. See id. at 226. 
168. Id. 
169.  Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968). 
170. Id.
 171. See id.
 172. Id. at 103.
 173. See id. (“The antecedents of today’s decision are many and unmistakable.  They 
are rooted in the foundation soil of our Nation.  They are fundamental to freedom.”). 
174. Id. at 103–04. 
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Here, the Court rooted its adherence to Madisonian neutrality in this area 
of its Establishment Clause doctrine in clear terms, stating that “[t]he First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, 
and between religion and nonreligion.”175 
The second antecedent was the foundational premise of the vital importance 
of the Court providing safeguards against Establishment Clause violations 
in the public schools,176 because “the First Amendment ‘does not tolerate 
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.’”177  The third antecedent 
incorporated the Jeffersonian “wall of separation” principle utilized in 
Everson, McCollum, Engel, and Schempp.178  Here, the Court strongly stated 
that “[t]here is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit 
the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles
or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.”179  The fourth and final 
antecedent was a reaffirmation of the validity of the Schempp purpose and 
primary effect test.180 
In applying these antecedents in Epperson, the Court determined that 
“[t]he State’s undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public 
schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, 
the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is 
based upon . . . fundamentalist sectarian conviction.”181  Because the Arkansas 
act was not one “of religious neutrality,” the Court held that the antievolution
teaching statute was a plain violation of the Establishment Clause.182 
F. Lemon v. Kurtzman 
The Court’s next major education law Establishment Clause case in 
1971, Lemon v. Kurtzman, articulated a new test for this jurisprudence,183 
175. Id. at 104. 
176. See id. at 104–05. 
177. Id. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
178. See id. at 106 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 
211 (1948)).
179. Id. at 106. 
180. See id. at 107 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222). 
181. Id. at 107–08. 
182. Id. at 109. 
183. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
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which still reflected Everson’s Madisonian neutrality.184  In Lemon, the 
Court held that two state statutes that provided state financial aid to nonpublic 
church-related elementary and secondary schools were violations of the 
Establishment Clause.185 Although Lemon does not fall within the category 
of cases regarding religious activities within public schools,186 it needs 
discussion in any school law Establishment Clause analysis given that the 
test has never been expressly overruled and that Lemon has been a preeminent 
force in the Court’s overall Establishment Clause doctrine.187 
Lemon incorporated the Madisonian neutrality principles that had been
present throughout the Court’s religious activities in public schools precedent. 
The Court did so by establishing a conjunctive,188 three-part framework
for determining if government action passes muster under the Establishment
Clause that expressly built upon the Schempp secular purpose and neutrality 
primary effect test.189  Under the Lemon test, in order to meet the requirements 
184. See Barry P. McDonald, Democracy’s Religion: Religious Liberty in the 
Rehnquist Court and into the Roberts Court, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2179, 2224 (stating that 
the tenet that the “government [must] remain neutral towards religion by refraining from 
either favoring or disfavoring a religious sect or religion in general” is “embodied in the 
Lemon test”). 
185. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606–07. 
186. See Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and 
the Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405, 421 (2009) 
(discussing Lemon as a government aid to religious schools case); Joseph O. Oluwole & 
Preston C. Green III, School Vouchers and Tax Benefits in Federal and State Judicial 
Constitutional Analysis, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1358 (2016) (same). 
187. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2079–80 (2019) 
(discussing the Lemon test’s shortcomings, but not expressly overruling it); Daniel O. 
Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 882 (1993) (discussing the longevity 
of Lemon in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Gabrielle Marie D’Adamo, 
Comment, Separatism in the Age of Public School Choice: A Constitutional Analysis, 
58 EMORY L.J. 547, 564 (2008) (discussing how the Lemon test has never been overruled); 
Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 89 (2017) 
(discussing the Lemon test’s place in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
188. See Valauri, supra note 75, at 142 (discussing the conjunctive nature of the Lemon 
test).
189. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (first citing Bd. of Educ.v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 
(1968); then quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (articulating
the three-prong, conjunctive test for constitutionality under the Establishment Clause); see 
also Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (articulating the secular 
purpose and primary effect test that was incorporated into the first two of the three prongs 
of the Lemon test: “to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a 
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion” 
(citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 442 (1961))); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (noting that if one 
criteria of the Lemon test is not satisfied, then the other criteria need not be considered to 
find an Establishment Clause violation). 
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of the Establishment Clause, 1) the government action “must have a 
secular legislative purpose”; 2) “its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and 3) the state action “must
not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”190  To 
make the determination regarding excessive government entanglement,
the Court stated that it will “examine the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, 
and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious 
authority.”191 
The Court then turned to an application of this test.192  Specifically at 
issue in the case was a Pennsylvania statute that provided reimbursement
to nonpublic schools for “teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional 
materials in specified secular subjects” and a Rhode Island statute that 
provided for the payment of 15% of nonpublic elementary school teachers’ 
salaries.193  These state payments included payments to private “church-
related educational institutions.”194  In applying this test, the Court found 
that both statutes passed the first secular legislative purpose prong, as their
legislative intents were “to enhance the quality of the secular education in 
all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws.”195  It was not “to 
advance religion.”196 
The Court then declined to decide the second prong regarding a neutral 
primary effect, as it found that the third entanglement prong was not satisfied
by these statutes.197  The Court began its entanglement analysis by noting
that “[t]he objective [of its Establishment Clause doctrine] is to prevent, 
as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the church or the state] into the 
precincts of the other.”198  However, the Court then noted this jurisprudence
did “not call for total separation between church and state [because] total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense” and interaction between 
190. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (first citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 243, then quoting
Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). 
191. Id. at 615. 
192. See id.
 193. Id. at 606–07. 
194. Id. at 607. 
195. Id. at 613. 
196. Id.
 197. See id. at 613–14. 
198. Id. at 614. 
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government and religion is inevitable.199  It continued this slight slide from 
the clearer Jeffersonian separation principle of its previous school law
Establishment Clause cases by noting that “[j]udicial caveats against
entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 
‘wall,’ is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship.”200 
In applying this third prong, the ultimate holding of the Court was that
“both statutes foster an impermissible degree of entanglement.”201  The 
Court found the Pennsylvania statute violated this prong, and, therefore, the
Establishment Clause, due to the excessive entanglement created by the
state giving public financial aid “directly to the church-related school[,]” 
rather than to students and parents like in Everson.202  Similarly, the Court 
found the Rhode Island statute was an excessive entanglement between 
government and religion in violation of the Establishment Clause based on 
the state payments going to teachers at “parochial schools [that] involve
substantial religious activity and purpose.”203 
In concluding its analysis, the Court incorporated the same notions of 
Madisonian neutrality as an objective of the Establishment Clause that had 
been at the foundation of all the Court’s religious activities in public schools 
cases.  In doing so, the Court highlighted the Framers’ intent in ratifying
the First Amendment: “the Constitution’s authors sought to protect religious
worship from the pervasive power of government”204 and “political division 
along religious lines.”205  The Court also reaffirmed its establishment approach 
as a way to respect both spheres of the church and state, as “[t]he history
of many countries attests to the hazards of religion’s intruding into the
political arena or of political power intruding into the legitimate and free 
exercise of religious belief.”206  The Court stated that, unlike these countries, 
America made the choice “that government is to be entirely excluded from 
the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the affairs of 
government.”207  Therefore, to preserve both religion and government, “lines
must be drawn.”208  The line that was drawn by the Court in Lemon was 
199. Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)). 
200. Id.
 201. Id. at 615. 
202. Id. at 621 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243–44 (1968); Everson 
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)). 
203. Id. at 616. 
204. Id. at 623. 
205. Id. at 622 (citing Freund, supra note 10, at 1692). 
206. Id. at 623. 
207. Id. at 625. 
208. Id. 
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one that aligned with the Court’s trajectory of incorporating Madisonian 
neutrality in its cases involving religious activities within public schools. 
G. Stone v. Graham 
The Court decided its next Establishment Clause case involving religious 
activities in public schools in the 1980 per curiam opinion of Stone v. 
Graham.209  In Stone, the Court correctly determined that the state action 
at issue was a violation of the Establishment Clause by applying the 
Madisonian neutrality-lensed secular purpose prong of the Lemon test.210 
In this application, the Court found that a Kentucky statute that “require[ed]
the posting of the Ten Commandments in [every] public school” classroom
“ha[d] no secular legislative purpose.”211 Instead, the Court determined 
that “[t]he pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on
schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature” because they are “undeniably 
a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths,” not materials integrated 
into the school curriculum for academic study.212  After a finding of a 
violation of the secular purpose prong, the Court did not need to continue 
its analysis under the Lemon test.213 
However, the Court did provide some application of the Madisonian
neutrality primary effect test that originated in Everson, even though it did 
not formally declare an application of the second prong of the Lemon 
test.214 Here, the Court determined that the effect of the required posting
would be “to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to
venerate and obey, the Commandments[,]” which “is not a permissible
state objective under the Establishment Clause.”215  This effect fell far 
short of the Madisonian neutrality requirement that the government neither
aid nor inhibit religion. Therefore, the Court found that the state law 
violated the secular purpose prong of Lemon, which mirrors the Schempp 
secular purpose test that originated from Everson’s Madisonian neutrality 
209.  449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
210. Id. at 40–41 (1980) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13). 
211. Id. at 41. 
212. Id. at 41–42. 
213. See id. at 40–41 (stating that if a government action violates any one of the 
Lemon prongs, it is an Establishment Clause violation). 
214. See id. at 42.
 215. Id. 
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ideology.216  It also rejected any type of “‘minor encroachment’” defense 
to insulate the challenged state action from constitutional invalidation.217 
Consequently, the Kentucky statute was correctly deemed unconstitutional 
under the Establishment Clause.218 
H. Wallace v. Jaffree 
The Court’s next religious activities in public schools case, the 1985 
Wallace v. Jaffree decision, continued to apply Madisonian neutrality.219 
Here, the Court correctly determined that an Alabama prayer and meditation
statute violated the Establishment Clause because it failed the secular 
purpose prong of Lemon.220 A father of three elementary school students
challenged the statute, “which authorize[d] a period of silence for ‘meditation 
or voluntary prayer’” in the state’s public schools.221 
Before moving to a direct articulation and application of the secular 
purpose inquiry, the Court rooted its examination of this issue qua the 
Madisonian neutrality principle of Everson. Here, the Court cited to 
Everson to set a foundational premise that “in the crucible of litigation,
the Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select
any religious faith or none at all.”222  In support of this conclusion, the 
Court directly cited to Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance to find that 
this neutrality requirement of the Establishment Clause 
derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual’s freedom
of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect
are the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful, and from recognition of
the fact that the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond 
intolerance among Christian sects—or even intolerance among “religions”—to 
encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain.223 
216. See id. at 40–42. 
217. See id. at 42 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)). 
218. Id. at 43. 
219.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60, 82 (1985). 
220. See id. at 41–42, 56. 
221. Id. at 41–42 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (repealed 1998)). 
222. Id. at 52–53; see also id. at 53 n.37 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 
15 (1947)).
223. Id. at 53–54; see also id. at 53 n.38 (citing JAMES MADISON, Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 299, 
299–301 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953)). 
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After setting this foundation, the Court conducted its secular purpose 
analysis under Lemon.224  Specifically, the Court continued to incorporate 
Madisonian conceptions of neutrality by stating that, in applying this test,
“it is appropriate to ask ‘whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion.’”225  Here, the Court found that the meditation 
and prayer “statute had no secular purpose” because the legislative record
expressly indicated that the purpose of the legislation was “‘to return voluntary 
prayer’ to the public schools.”226  The Court stated that this express “legislative 
intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different
from merely protecting every student’s right to engage in voluntary prayer 
during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday.”227  The 
Court concluded that the state’s intent to “characterize prayer as a favored
practice” was “an endorsement [that] is not consistent with the established
principle that the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality
toward religion.”228  With this conclusion, the Court directly cited to 
Everson’s application of Madisonian neutrality.229 
I. Edwards v. Aguillard 
In its 1987 Edwards v. Aguillard decision, the Supreme Court continued 
to employ Everson Madisonian neutrality through the application of the 
first criteria of the Lemon test.230  In this case, the Court found that a Louisiana 
creationism statute failed to pass constitutional muster under that prong.231 
The state act, which required that any public school teaching of evolution
must be accompanied by creation science instruction, was challenged by 
parents of public schoolchildren, public school teachers, and religious leaders 
under the Establishment Clause.232 
In this case, the Court found that, although states and school boards
should be given considerable deference in their operation of the public 
224. See id. at 55–56. 
225. Id. at 56 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)).
226. Id. at 56–57. 
227. Id. at 59. 
228. Id. at 60. 
229. See id. at 60 n.50. 
230. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987). 
231. Id. at 594, 597. 
232. Id. at 581. 
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schools, these entities must still act in accordance with the First Amendment.233 
Therefore, judicial deference to state action involving religion in the 
public schools will always take a backseat to a proper enforcement of the
Establishment Clause.234 This finding provided the foundation for the Court’s 
discussion of the singular importance of Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
in school law, which requires heightened judicial monitoring of school 
activity for compliance with that clause.235 The Court then explicitly linked 
this particular vigilance with the necessary neutrality that it must employ 
in properly interpreting this religion clause in the school law context: 
“Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not 
purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the
private beliefs of the student and his or her family.”236  Because of the 
impressionability of schoolchildren, the role-modeling effect of teachers 
for students, and the coercion that inheres in compulsory attendance school 
requirements, the Court highlighted the need for acute awareness of how 
the Establishment Clause could be violated in this educative environment.237 
The Court stated that these guiding neutrality principles had required it “to 
invalidate statutes which advance religion in public elementary and secondary
schools” on multiple occasions.238 
In applying the first prong of the Lemon test in light of the special 
circumstances of the school environment,239 the Court determined that the 
creationism statute had “no clear secular purpose.”240  Here, the Court 
articulated that it need only give deference to a state’s articulated secular
purpose when that statement is sincere.241  The Court found that “the Act’s 
stated purpose . . . to protect academic freedom” was an insincere sham 
purpose.242  Instead, the Court determined that the purpose of the statute
was a preeminently religious one that was designed to “discredit[] ‘evolution 
by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of 
233. Id. at 583 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)). 
234. See id.
 235. See id. at 583–84 (citing Pico, 457 U.S. at 864). 
236. Id. at 584. 
237. See id.
 238. Id.
 239. See id. at 585 (“Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we must 
do so mindful of the particular concerns that arise in the context of public elementary and 
secondary schools.”). 
240. Id.
 241. Id. at 586–87. 
242. Id. at 586–87 (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (2020)). 
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creationism[.]’”243  For the Court, the legislative intent to advance a “religious
viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind”244 was clear in 
the statute’s effect that would “restructure the science curriculum to conform 
with a particular religious viewpoint.”245  Such a purpose and effect did 
not align with the Everson conceptions of Madisonian neutrality that the 
Court had employed throughout its education law jurisprudence involving
religious activities in public schools.  Therefore, because it sought “to employ 
the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious 
purpose” and to advance a particular religious belief, the Act violated the
Establishment Clause.246 
J. Lee v. Weisman 
In its 1992 Lee v. Weisman case, the Court continued to employ Madisonian 
neutrality to evaluate the constitutionality of a Rhode Island policy that
allowed public school administrators to invite clergy members to deliver 
invocation and benediction prayers at middle and high school graduation
ceremonies.247 Under this policy, a middle school principal invited a rabbi
to give a nonsectarian invocation and benediction at the school’s graduation.248 
The graduation took place at the school, and attendance of the graduation
ceremony was not compulsory.249  The invocation and benediction prayers
were both addressed to and gave thanks to God.250  The students stood during 
the prayers.251  A father of a middle school student who attended the graduation
ceremony brought a constitutional lawsuit on behalf of his daughter and 
himself, seeking a permanent injunction barring these prayers in future 
public school graduations as they violate the Establishment Clause.252 
At the outset of its analysis, the Court stated that it need not reconsider 
“the general constitutional framework by which public schools’ efforts to 
243. Id. at 589 (quoting Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (1985), aff’d, 
482 U.S. 578 (1987)). 
244. Id. at 591. 
245. Id. at 593. 
246. Id. at 593, 597. 
247. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992). 
248. Id. at 581. 
249. Id. at 583–84. 
250. See id. at 581–82. 
251. Id. at 583. 
252. Id. at 584. 
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accommodate religion are measured” or the Lemon test, because its religion 
education precedents made clear that this school graduation rabbinical 
prayer was a violation of the Establishment Clause.253  Turning to its analysis, 
the Court reaffirmed the necessary neutrality that is required to balance 
the Religion Clauses in any First Amendment constitutional inquiry.254  In 
light of this recognized need for neutrality, the Court was firm in stating 
that the Constitution’s minimum threshold for educational establishment 
cases is a “guarantee[] that government may not coerce anyone to support 
or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”255  The 
Court expressly cited Everson for this “beyond dispute” minimum,256 signaling
the Court’s continued adherence to the Madisonian neutrality that had unified 
all of its previous precedents on religious activities in public schools. 
In evaluating this baseline in the context of the state’s involvement in
the middle school graduation prayer, the Court found a violation of these 
core principles.257  Specifically, the Court determined that “[t]he government
involvement with religious activity in this case [was] pervasive, to the 
point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in
a public school.”258  For the Court, the school graduation prayer demonstrated
a disavowal of the state’s “duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable
conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people.”259  Consequently, 
it was a violation of the Establishment Clause.260 
Throughout the decision, the Court relied heavily on the constitutional 
coercion that inheres in school prayer, but this coercion analysis was rooted 
in Madisonian neutrality.261  The Court noted the particular importance of
neutrality in analyzing religious activities in K-12 schools.262  The Court 
stressed that constitutional coercion concerns are magnified in a school 
environment where “subtle coercive pressure[s]” exist.263  This requires 
253. Id. at 586–87. 
254. See id. at 587 (“The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise
of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment
Clause.”). 
255. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
256. See id.
 257. See id.
 258. Id.
 259. Id. at 592. 
260. Id. at 599. 
261. See id. at 590 (referencing Madison’s conception of neutrality as “the principal 
author of the Bill of Rights”). 
262. Id. at 588. 
263. Id. at 592. 
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the Court to make Establishment Clause determinations that are recognizant
of the “heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from 
subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.”264 
This heightened concern is amplified when analyzing religious activities 
that impact the impressionable constituency of public schoolchildren.
Here, the Court stressed that, in a school context, what might seem like a 
reasonable request to respect a believer’s religious practice may appear
to a nonbeliever to be the use of state machinery “to enforce a religious
orthodoxy.”265  The Establishment Clause bars a state from placing K-12 
schoolchildren in this position, rejecting any type of “choice theory” to 
participate in religious exercises that might be applicable to “mature 
adults.”266  The Court clearly established that such a theory was inapposite 
in the context of whether the Establishment Clause was violated by the 
state’s involvement in religious exercises involving children, because children 
are different from adults and acutely susceptible to coercive and conformist 
pressures.267  In recognizing this special school environment and its
student inhabitants, the Court emphasized the importance of fidelity to 
Madisonian neutrality when public school prayer is directed toward this 
impressionable group of constitutional constituents.268 
After this emphasis, the Court continued to maintain fidelity with its 
other religious activities in schools precedents and their adherence to the 
Madisonian conceptions of neutrality.  The Court expressly cited to Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance to justify its neutrality approach, which is 
264. Id.
 265. Id.
 266. See id. at 593 (discussing the difference of maturity in evaluating choice 
theories in establishment analysis).
267. See id. at 593–94 (“Research in psychology supports the common assumption
that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and
that the influence is strongest in matters of social convention. . . . To recognize that the 
choice imposed by the State constitutes an unacceptable constraint only acknowledges that 
the government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use 
more direct means.” (citations omitted) (citing Clay V. Britain, Adolescent Choices and 
Parent-Peer Cross-Pressures, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 385 (1963); Donna Rae Classen & B. 
Bradford Brown, The Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in Adolescence, 14 J. YOUTH 
& ADOLESCENCE 451 (1985); B. Bradford Brown, Donna R. Clasen & Sue A. Eicher, 
Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity Dispositions, and Self-Reported Behavior 
Among Adolescents, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 521 (1986))). 
268. See id. at 590 (discussing how “the imprint of the State” on the graduation prayers
“put school-age children who objected in an untenable position”). 
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designed to protect the religious and conscientious liberties of all Americans,
no matter their beliefs, as well as the spheres of both the state and the
church: 
The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and
religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the
State.  The design of the Constitution is that preservation and transmission of 
religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the 
private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission.  It must 
not be forgotten then, that while concern must be given to define the protection 
granted to an objector or a dissenting nonbeliever, these same Clauses exist to protect 
religion from government interference. James Madison, the principal author of the 
Bill of Rights, did not rest his opposition to a religious establishment on the sole 
ground of its effect on the minority.269 
Building on these conceptions of neutrality, the Court also rejected the 
state’s attempt to use the “civic or nonsectarian” nature of the prayer as a
defense to the constitutional violation.270 In continuing to adhere to the 
Madisonian neutrality of its religion education precedents, the Court found 
that this majoritarian approach was not a way to evade the contours of the
Establishment Clause: “That the intrusion was in the course of promulgating
religion that sought to be civic or nonsectarian rather than pertaining to 
one sect does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objectors. At best 
it narrows their number, at worst increases their sense of isolation and 
affront.”271 
In applying this neutrality-aimed coercion framework to the public
school graduation ceremony prayers, the Court found that impermissible 
Establishment Clause coercion was present.272  The Court noted that the 
state exerted undeniable public and peer pressure upon students to stand 
or be respectfully silent during the invocation and benediction through its 
supervision and control of the graduation ceremony.273  For the Court, such 
“pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt 
compulsion.”274  The coercive impact of such pressure on a schoolchild
dissenter, “who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the
State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow,” inflicts a real,
constitutional injury.275 
269. Id. at 589–90. 
270. Id. at 594. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. at 593. 
273. Id.
 274. Id. 
275. Id. 
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The Court stated that finding no Establishment Clause violation in this
scenario would force these public school students into “the dilemma of
participating [in the religious prayer exercise], with all that implies, or 
protesting.”276 The Court deemed this to be a constitutionally untenable
choice based on the pressures on schoolchildren that are inherent in the 
school environment. It did so through a reaffirmance of the necessary
balance that was at the core of Madison’s objectives in drafting the First
Amendment: 
[The Government] fails to acknowledge that what for many . . . classmates and 
their parents was a spiritual imperative was for Daniel and Deborah Weisman 
religious conformance compelled by the State.  While in some societies the 
wishes of the majority might prevail, the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment is addressed to this contingency and rejects the balance urged upon 
us.277 
The Court also incorporated these coercion principles into its rejection of 
the state’s claim that the lack of compulsory attendance at the graduation
ceremony served to insulate these school prayers from violating the
Establishment Clause.278  Dismissing such an argument as formalism at its
extreme, the Court emphasized the universal social and cultural recognition 
of the significance of school graduation,279 which made the graduation 
with its religious exercise “in a fair and real sense obligatory.”280 
The Court refused to uphold a Hobson’s choice for American public 
schoolchildren, as absence from such ceremonies “would require forfeiture 
of those intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth
and all her high school years.”281  In line with Madison’s original intent, 
the Court flatly rejected any type of required forfeitures on the part of a 
school-age objector to avoid compromising one’s religious or conscientious 
liberties.282 The Court emphasized that, just as it is a core First Amendment 
tenet “that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her
rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored
religious practice,” it is clear “[t]he Constitution forbids the State to exact 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 595–96. 
278. See id. at 595. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 586. 
281. Id. at 595. 
282. See id. at 596. 
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religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own high
school graduation.”283 
Finally, the Court rejected the “minor encroachment” argument asserted
by the state as an attempt to insulate these graduation prayers from a 
finding of an Establishment Clause violation, as it had in Engel, Schempp, 
and Stone.284  Here, the Court reiterated the central principles at the heart 
of its stare decisis to Madisonian neutrality for cases involving religious 
exercises in schools.285  On one side of this balance, the Court found that 
it would be an insult to the religious leader who delivered the prayers and 
the religious adherents to frame these school prayers as de minimis 
religious activity.286  The Court then turned to balance the constitutional 
considerations for the minority students who were coerced to participate
in a religious exercise through the prayer, to which they did not adhere. 
Although the amount of time spent in coercive participation in the prayer 
was brief, the effect of this participation was a long-lasting and significant 
constitutional injury.287 
The Court’s conclusion reflected the imperative neutrality considerations 
for vigilant constitutional analysis of religious activities in the special 
environment of public schools.288  The Court then expressly relied upon
its past religion education precedents to determine that public schools do 
not have the constitutional power to “persuade or compel a student to 
participate in a religious exercise.”289  Because the Court determined that 
these public school graduation prayers did compel the special constitutional 
constituency of students to do so, it held that this was an Establishment 
Clause violation.290  The necessary Madisonian neutrality that the Court 
continued to incorporate into its religious activities in public schools 
jurisprudence simply was not satisfied. 
283. Id.
 284. See id. at 592, 594, 599; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962); 
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1963); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 
39, 42 (1980). 
285. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 594. 
286. Id. at 594 (“To do so would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them and to 
all those for whom the prayers were an essential and profound recognition of divine authority.”). 
287. Id.
 288. See id. at 598–99. 
289. Id. at 599. 
290. Id. 
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K. Board of Education v. Grumet 
The Court followed Madisonian neutrality, as it had throughout its 
religious activities in public schools cases since Everson, in its next 
decision, Board of Education v. Grumet.291 Unlike these previous cases,
this analysis dealt with an all-encompassing state act that would result in 
daily concerns regarding religious activities within an entire public school 
district.292 Although this decision is arguably difficult to categorize,293 
these potential concerns justify its placement into the category of the
Court’s cases dealing with religious activities in public schools.  In this 
1994 decision, the Court held that a special New York statute that carved
out a distinct public school district to serve the village of Kiryas Joel, “a 
religious enclave of Satmar Hasidism,” was a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.294 The Court’s holding was premised upon a finding that “this
unusual Act is tantamount to an allocation of political power on a religious
criterion and neither presupposes nor requires government impartiality 
toward religion.”295 
The Court began by discussing the vigorously religious village inhabitants
who educated their children in private religious schools as part of their
beliefs that they should “make few concessions to the modern world and 
go to great lengths to avoid assimilation into it.”296  However, these schools 
did not provide services to disabled children.297 Although the nearby public
school district originally provided these services to the village children at
one of the private religious schools, this practice was discontinued based
on the Court’s previous decisions that certain service provisions to nonpublic 
religious schools were violations of the Establishment Clause.298 
291.  512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
292. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 87, 96 (1996) (discussing the unique circumstances of the Grumet case); 
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1297, 1325 (1994) (stating the case presents a “unique problem”). 
293. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1667, 1703 (2006) (discussing the difficulty in categorizing the Grumet case, especially 
when trying to “assimilate [it] to the current doctrinal structure”). 
294. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 690. 
295. Id.
 296. Id. at 691. 
297. Id. at 692. 
298. See id. 
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Consequently, Kiryas Joel children who required special education 
began to “attend public schools outside the village, which their families 
found highly unsatisfactory.”299 Thereafter, many of these students withdrew 
from these schools because of the children’s emotional trauma “‘in leaving 
their own community and being with people whose ways were so different.’”300 
These mass withdrawals left just one child from the village attending
public schools by 1989; the other disabled children either went without 
services or received privately funded services.301  This led to the New York 
legislature passing a law that created a separate special public school district
for Kiryas Joel,302 which had “plenary legal authority over the elementary
and secondary education of all school-aged children in the village.”303 
In evaluating the constitutionality of this state action, the Court’s 
majority applied a neutrality test in striking down the New York statute, 
because of the legislative failure “to exercise governmental authority in a 
religiously neutral way.”304  For the Court, the creation of the special school
district was a clear legislative act of preference for religion: 
The anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature’s exercise of state authority in
creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any direct
way to review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding a principle at the
heart of the Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion
to another, or religion to irreligion.305 
The Court found this preferential treatment allocated to a singular religious
community, rather than “one of many communities eligible for equal 
treatment under a general law,” was “legislative favoritism along religious 
lines” that ran contrary to “[t]he general principle that civil power must be 
exercised in a manner neutral to religion.”306  As a result, the Court concluded 
the statute was a violation of the Establishment Clause.307 
However, the Court emphasized its Establishment Clause jurisprudence
neutrality requirements still provided for “ample room under the Establishment 
Clause for benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to 
299. Id. 
300. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988)). 
301. Id. at 693. 
302. See id. (citing 1989 N.Y. Laws 3249) 
303. Id. at 693–94 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 2020)). 
304. Id. at 703. 
305. Id.
 306. Id. at 703–04. 
307. Id. at 705. 
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exist without sponsorship and without interference.”308  Such accommodation 
of religion, though, “is not a principle without limits,” and this type of
legislative preferential treatment falls outside of those limits as an 
“unconstitutional delegation of political power to a religious group.”309 
As the Court emphasized, while citing to Everson, a central rationale of 
the Establishment Clause is the protection of both spheres of church and
state from harmful action by the other.310 
The Grumet plurality decision also focused on the “course of ‘neutrality’
toward religion,” which is required by the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment.311 This neutrality expressly echoed Madison’s views by requiring 
that the state “favor[] neither one religion over others nor religious adherents 
collectively over nonadherents.”312  The plurality determined that the New
York statute violated this neutrality requirement.313  Specifically, the law
“depart[ed] from this constitutional command by delegating the State’s 
discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its character 
as a religious community, in a legal and historical context that gives no 
assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised neutrally.”314 
Here, the plurality reflected the majority’s decision “that neutrality as among 
religions must be honored” under the requirements of the Establishment
Clause.315 
Consequently, the majority and the plurality decisions reaffirmed the 
Court’s adherence to Madisonian neutrality in religious activities in public 
schools Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  The majority stated that it 
was “clearly constrained to conclude that the statute . . . fails the test of 
neutrality.”316  Through the delegation of a power that “‘ranks at the very 
apex of the function of a State,’ . . . to an electorate defined by common 
308. Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (internal quotations omitted)). 
309. Id. at 706. 
310. See id. at 697 (“Establishment Clause prevents the State from ‘participat[ing] 
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.’” (quoting Everson v. 
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947))). 
311. Id. at 696 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 792–93 (1973)). 
312. Id.
 313. Id.
 314. Id. 
315. Id. at 707. 
316. See id. at 709. 
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religious belief and practice,” the state acted “in a manner that fails to 
foreclose religious favoritism.”317  Therefore, this clearly nonneutral act
was a violation of the Establishment Clause.318 
L. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 
In its next, and last to date, decision involving religious activities in 
public schools, the Court continued to apply a constitutional analysis that 
reflected Madisonian neutrality.  In 2000, the Court examined another 
Establishment Clause and school prayer case in Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe.319  At issue in this case was a Texas school district’s 
policy that “permit[ted] students to deliver a brief invocation and/or
message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity
football games to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship
and student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the
competition.”320 Under the policy, the student who would deliver the 
invocation was selected by an annual, secret ballot, student body election
from a list of student volunteers.321  The selected student would decide the 
content of the message as long as it complied with the policy.322  Under 
the policy, one additional provision was included in the case that the 
school district was judicially enjoined from enforcing the policy: “Any 
message and/or invocation delivered by a student must be nonsectarian
and nonproselytizing.’”323 
The Court determined this policy, which “allowed students to . . . deliver 
overtly Christian prayers over the public address system at home football 
games,” was an Establishment Clause violation.324  At the outset of its analysis, 
the Court emphasized that the Constitution did not prohibit all religious 
activities in the American public schools as the purpose of the First 
Amendment’s Religion Clauses was the security of religious liberty.325 
So, it does not “prohibit[] any public school student from voluntarily praying 
at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.”326  The Court also 
317. Id. at 709–10 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)). 
318. See id. at 710 (finding the legislative act crossed “the line from permissible 
accommodation to impermissible establishment”).
319.  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000). 




 324. Id. at 295, 301. 
325. Id. at 313. 
326. Id. 
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balanced the recognition of many communities’ desires to include public 
prayer at significant occasions with the need for school religious activity
to align with the First Amendment.327  The Establishment Clause requires
this balance because the religious liberty that the Clause was designed to 
protect “is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular 
religious practice of prayer.”328  These foundational statements reflected 
the Court’s continued adherence to Madisonian neutrality in its jurisprudence 
involving religious exercises at public schools. 
In turning to an analysis premised on this fidelity, the Court first
determined that the student invocations did not constitute private speech 
endorsing religion, which would be protected under the Free Speech and 
Free Exercise clauses and would not give rise to any Establishment Clause
violation.329  Instead, the Court determined that the invocation was government 
speech; thus, the Establishment Clause applied.330  There were several reasons 
for this classification of the student religious speech.  First, the “invocations 
[were] authorized by a government policy and [took] place on government
property at government-sponsored school-related events.”331  The delivery
of the invocation by a speaker representing the student body, who was 
under school supervision, at a school-sponsored function on school property
over the school’s public address system in a pregame ceremony that typically 
included the football team, cheerleaders, and band members all dressed in 
school uniforms with the school’s name emblazoned on the field, along with
banners and flags with the school’s name, would lead an objective high 
school student to “unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer 
as stamped with her school’s seal of approval,”332 rather than the private
speech of an individual student.
Additionally, the Court determined that these invocations were not
protected private student speech because they were “subject to particular
regulations that confine the content and topic of the student’s message.”333 
327. See id. at 307. 
328. Id. at 313. 
329. See id. at 302. 
330. See Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging
Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. 
L. REV. 681, 708 (2001) (discussing this analysis).
331. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 302. 
332. Id. at 307–08. 
333. Id. at 303. 
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The Court rejected the school district’s argument that the policy was “one 
of neutrality rather than endorsement.”334 Here, the Court determined that 
the policy with its express inclusion of an invocation “invite[d] and encourage[d]
religious messages,” because an invocation is defined as “a prayer of 
entreaty that is usu[ally] a call for the divine presence and is offered at the
beginning of a meeting or service of worship” and because the history of
the school’s invocations had all been “focused religious message[s].”335 
The Court emphasized that the name of the policy, “Prayer at Football 
Games,” also demonstrated that the specific purpose of the policy was not 
a secular purpose; it “was to preserve a popular ‘state-sponsored religious 
practice’” in a content-limited way that took the invocation out of the
realm of private speech.336  Consequently, the Court determined that the
“school policy . . . explicitly and implicitly encourage[d] public prayer.”337 
Finally, the Court determined that these invocations were government 
speech subject to the Establishment Clause because they were the product 
of a state selective access and majoritarian process via the school-authorized 
election.338  This latter reasoning again reflected the balance required by
Madisonian neutrality when the Court evaluates religious activities in public 
schools. The Court was troubled by the fact that “the majoritarian process 
implemented by the District guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates 
will never prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced.”339  In 
doing so, the state was placing students with minority religious and conscientious
views “at the mercy of the majority.”340  Likening the case to Lee, in which 
the Court rejected a state’s attempted majoritarian defense of “civic or
nonsectarian” prayer to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, the Court 
found the school’s majoritarian invocation approach did not cure its 
constitutional deficiencies: while the “majoritarian election might ensure 
that most of the students are represented, it does nothing to protect the
341 minority; indeed, it likely serves to intensify their offense.”
Here, the balance of protection for religious minority schoolchildren, 
which had been prominent in much of the Court’s Madisonian neutrality 
analyses in school law cases, was of particular concern in that the federal 
334. Id. at 305. 
335. Id. at 306–07, 307 n.19 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
1190 (Philip Babcock Grove ed., 1993)). 
336. Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)). 
337. Id. at 310. 
338. Id. at 303–04. 
339. Id. at 304. 
340. Id. 
341. Id. at 305 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 594). 
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district court had to allow the Catholic and Mormon student and family
litigants to proceed anonymously as a prophylactic measure to keep them 
“from intimidation or harassment.”342  Consequently, the Court’s constitutional
concerns of safeguarding the religious and conscientious liberties of students 
in its previous case law evaluating the constitutionality of religious practices
in public schools were central in its determination that this was school-
sponsored speech that was not insulated from Establishment Clause scrutiny. 
The Court made clear that such “[s]chool sponsorship of a religious message
is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to members of the 
audience who are nonadherants ‘that they are outsiders, not full members 
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherants 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.’”343 
As a result, the Court held that these invocations were not private speech
and, therefore, were subject to Establishment Clause analysis.344 
After this determination, the Court applied a coercion analysis that, like 
Lee, was reflective of the Madisonian conception of neutrality.  First, the 
Court examined the divisiveness that resulted from the policy, which was
in direct conflict with the Madisonian balancing that was meant to avoid 
religious strife.345  The unconstitutional coercion here resulted from the state’s 
decision to authorize majoritarian elections that produced a student who 
would deliver a religious message.346 
Next, the Court dismissed the state’s attempt to argue that, unlike the 
graduation ceremony of Lee, coercion was not present because attendance
at an extracurricular football game was voluntary.347  The Court rejected
this argument, given that certain students, like the football team, cheerleaders, 
and band members, were required to attend, and given that other adolescent 
students would feel the pressure to attend based on their susceptibility “‘to 
pressure from their peers towards conformity.’”348  The Court also echoed 
its disavowal in Lee of a forfeiture proposition in the context of Establishment 
Clause educational law, finding that 
342. Id. at 294 & n.1.
 343. Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring)). 
344. Id. at 310. 
345. See id. at 311. 
346. See id.
 347. Id. at 311–12. 
348. Id. at 311–12 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992)). 
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The Constitution . . . demands that the school may not force this difficult choice 
[between attending these games and avoiding personally offensive religious 
rituals] upon these students for “[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that the 
State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as
the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.”349 
The Court then concluded “that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the 
improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of
religious worship.”350  It was clear to the Court that orthodoxy cannot be
constitutionally enforced by the state through either direct means or 
through social pressure.351  Here, the special circumstances of the school 
context meant that this state action was the enforcement of religious 
orthodoxy through the pressured forfeiture of the First Amendment rights 
of nonadherent schoolchildren, just like the schoolchildren in Lee.352 This 
type of tit-for-tat is unconstitutional coercion, as the Constitution will not
allow the state “‘to exact religious conformity from a student as the price’ 
of joining her classmates at a varsity football game.”353  Therefore, the Court 
found that this policy and the coercion that resulted from it violated the 
Establishment Clause because “the religious liberty protected by the Constitution
is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious
practice of prayer.”354  Such coercion, like the coercion in Lee, was a clear 
violation of the required Madisonian neutrality in the school law cases that
the Court had applied since its first school law case of Everson. 
M. Stare Decisis Fidelity to Madisonian Neutrality in the 
Court’s Religious Activities in Public Schools 
Establishment Clause Cases 
Throughout all of these religious practices in public schools cases, a
unifying thread is fidelity to the key Framer’s conception of neutrality that
prohibits the state from either aiding or inhibiting religion.  It is this fidelity
that brings clarification to what has been deemed a thicket in education law
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This Madisonian neutrality, as applied 
in “Everson’s paradigm cases to derive a prescriptive guideline,” is used
as “a label for the required relationship between the government and religion 
as a state of equipoise between government as ally and government as 
349. Id. at 312 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 596). 
350. Id. 
351. See id.
 352. Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 592, 596). 
353. Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 596). 
354. Id. at 313. 
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adversary.”355 This articulation of neutrality is “tantamount to constitutionality”
for an Establishment Clause analysis.356  In each of the Court’s ten religious
activities in public schools cases, the Court has employed this Everson 
neutrality, with its Madisonian roots, to determine correctly that the necessary 
state of equipoise had not been achieved by the challenged state action.357 
By doing so, the Court has properly interpreted the Establishment 
Clause in accordance with the original intent of the original drafter and
“principal architect of the Bill of Rights,”358 Madison himself.359  It is a 
matter of historical record that Madison had a “tremendous influence” on 
the framing of the Establishment Clause,360 and, as the Court has recognized,
his views on religious liberty were incorporated into the Constitution.361 
Consequently, Madison should be considered the preeminent historical 
reference point for interpreting the meaning of this First Amendment 
clause, as his conception of conscientious liberty is an integral part of 
proper constitutional analysis in this area.362  Therefore, it is singularly
appropriate for the Supreme Court to premise its religious activities in
public schools jurisprudence upon Madisonian neutrality.
This constitutional conception of Madisonian neutrality can be traced to
his 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance,363 which has been cited repeatedly by
the Court in its education law jurisprudence and which spurred “a provision
prohibiting the establishment of religion [to become] a part of Virginia 
355.  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 882–83 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
356. Id. at 883. 
357. See supra Sections III.A–III.L. 
358. See Preston C. Green, III, Julie F Mead & Joseph O. Oluwole, Parents Involved, 
School Assignment Plans, and the Equal Protection Clause: The Case for Special Constitutional 
Rules, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 503, 540 (2011). 
359. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(discussing Madison’s incorporation of “the guarantees of free exercise and against 
the establishment of religion . . . into the Federal Bill of Rights”). 
360. See Daniel A. Spiro, The Creation of a Free Marketplace of Religious Ideas: 
Revisiting the Establishment Clause After the Alabama Secular Humanism Decision, 39 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1987) (discussing this influence). 
361. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963) (noting this 
constitutional incorporation of Madisonian views). 
362. See Timothy J. Tracey, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: In Hindsight, 
34 U. HAW. L. REV. 71, 82 (2012) (citing Madison as the key authority for Establishment 
Clause interpretation); E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 1246 (1994) (explaining that Madison has “had a unique 
influence on our understanding of what the Establishment Clause means”).
363. MADISON, supra note 123, at 187, 190. 
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law.”364  In it, Madison emphasized the core principle of neutrality as a 
necessary liberty in a new America:365 
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of 
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. 
This right is in its nature an unalienable right. . . . It is the duty of every man to 
render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable 
to him.366 
Madison’s articulation in the Memorial and Remonstrance demonstrated 
his sensitivity to how official religious practices would be violative of 
some individuals’ religious and conscientious beliefs.367  Madison pressed 
neutrality as the way to avoid the divisions and pressures on minorities 
created by the imposition of state religion and to ensure the liberties of 
conscience of all.368 
Here, Madison was not proposing antireligious principles.369  Instead, 
his argument “insisted on state neutrality between religions and between
religion and non-religion.”370 So, he advocated neutrality not only as a way
to avoid the harms of divisiveness and to assure liberty of conscience,371 
364. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 605–06 (discussing the impact of the Memorial and 
Remonstrance on the Virginia law). 
365. See Richard Albert, The Separation of Higher Powers, 65 SMU L. REV. 3, 42– 
43 (2012) (discussing Madison’s repeated connections between liberty and federalism). 
366. MADISON, supra note 123, at 184. 
367. See Wallace, supra note 362, at 1254 (discussing this understanding of Madison). 
368. This dovetails with Madison’s greater intent in drafting the Constitution as a 
way to “design[] a system to neutralize division.”  Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: 
Tobacco and Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 452 (2000). 
369. See Greg Sergienko, Social Contract Neutrality and the Religion Clauses of the 
Federal Constitution, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1291 (1996) (describing Madison as a “religious
individual[]”); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the 
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 967–68 (1989) (explaining how “Madison
defended the ‘unalienable right’ of religious freedom with an explicitly religious premise”
in his Memorial and Remonstrance).
370. Mark A. Graber, Foreword: Our Paradoxical Religion Clauses, 69 MD. L. REV. 
8, 10 (2009). 
371. See Patricia E. Curry, James Madison and the Burger Court: Converging Views 
of Church-State Separation, 56 IND. L.J. 615, 619 (1981) (discussing Madison’s view in 
the Memorial and Remonstrance that religious establishment should not be permitted 
because it “promote[s] faction” and “is fundamentally divisive” (citing MADISON, supra
note 123, at 187–90)); René Reyes, Justice Souter’s Religion Clause Jurisprudence: Judgments 
of Conscience, 43 CONN. L. REV. 303, 311 (2010) (discussing Madison’s conception of 
liberty of consciences as requiring freedom from coercive religious practices); Francisco 
Valdes, Piercing Webs of Power: Identity, Resistance, and Hope in LatCrit Theory and 
Praxis, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 913 n.49 (2000) (“The divisive and vexatious power 
of human faith in organized religions prompted James Madison to cite this phenomenon 
as one of the reasons for a system of government that separates and disperses political 
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but also to preserve inviolability between the spheres of government and 
religion.372  In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison specifically called 
for recognition of these aims: 
Above all are they to be considered as retaining an “equal title to the free exercise 
of Religion according to the dictates of Conscience.”  Whilst we assert for 
ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we
believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose 
minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this 
freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not against man: To God, 
therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered.  As the Bill violates 
equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens, so it violates the same principle,
by granting to others peculiar exemptions.373 
This advocacy for the preservation of distinct governmental and religious
spheres did not make its only appearance in Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance. It was also evident in Madison’s 1788 statements at the 
Virginia convention ratifying the Constitution, wherein he stated that “‘[t]here 
is not a shadow of right in the [federal] government to intermeddle with
religion. Its least interference would be a most flagrant usurpation.’”374 
This conception of neutrality, with its explicit ties to safeguarding
necessary religious and conscientious liberties in a democratic republic to 
protect minorities and the spheres of church and state, was also in Madison’s
original proposals for the amendments to the Constitution at the First 
Congress, which he reported to the House of Representatives on June 8, 
1789.375  Here, Madison called on his fellow Representatives to amend the 
power: ‘different opinions concerning religion’ cause humans to ‘vex and oppress each other.’” 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 18 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966))). 
372. See M. Elisabeth Bergeron, Note, “New Age” or New Testament?: Toward A 
More Faithful Interpretation of “Religion”, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 365, 369 (1991) (“James 
Madison, however, understood that religious and secular interests alike were advanced by
diffusing and decentralizing power; both religion and government could reach their independent
goals only if each were allowed to flourish in its own sphere.” (citing THE FEDERALIST 
NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison))).
373. MADISON, supra note 123, at 300 (quoting THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
art. 16 (1776)).
374. Spiro, supra note 360, at 12 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
2d ed. 1891)).
375. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440–41, 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (providing
Madison’s introduction to the proposed amendments to the Constitution). 
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Constitution as a way to demonstrate their “sincere[] devot[ion] to liberty 
and a Republican Government.”376 
In a compelling and convincing manner, Madison set the foundation of
these proposed constitutional amendments on the importance of “prudent 
constitutional reasoning to the practical governance of a large republic.”377 
These original proposed amendments included a provision that “[t]he civil 
rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”378 
After introducing all of his proposed amendments, Madison demarcated
the primacy of this proposed amendment, labeling “[t]he freedom of the 
press and rights of conscience” as the “choicest privileges of the people.”379 
Like the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison’s introduction of the 
proposals for the Bill of Rights in the First Congress stated that a motivating
force in these amendments was to protect the minority: 
in a Government modified like this of the United States, the great danger lies 
rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative body. The prescriptions
in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against that quarter where the greatest
danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of power.  But 
this is not found in either the executive or legislative departments of Government, 
but in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority.380 
Madison viewed these constitutional amendments as “one means to control 
the majority from those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined.”381 
Consequently, this proposed amendment aligned with his essays on government
and the Federalist Papers.382  All of these writings demonstrated “that 
Madison saw religion as a crucial oppositional force in politics and a vital 
check on the tyranny of the majority, but only when its role is properly
structured to prevent it from serving instead as an instrument of popular
tyranny.”383 
Madison also emphasized the importance of the judiciary in proposing
these amendments to the Constitution, stating that if the Bill of Rights was 
376. See id. at 449. 
377. J. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good for? War Power, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Deliberation, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 685, 724 (2001). 
378. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 375, at 451. 
379. Id. at 453. 
380. Id. at 454–55. 
381. Id. at 455. 
382. See Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions 
from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L.REV. 783, 799 (2002) (discussing 
the interconnectedness in Madison’s writings). 
383. Id. 
50 
[VOL. 58:  1, 2021]  Framers’ Fidelity and Thicket Theory 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
“incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights.”384 
Madison stressed the important role that the judicial branch would play as 
a matter of checks and balances; for him, the judiciary would “be an 
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative 
or executive.”385  The Bill of Rights would invigorate the judiciary to be 
“naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated 
for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.”386  So, for Madison, 
vigilant judicial review was vital for the preservation of the constitutional 
rights if these proposed amendments were adopted. 
After these proposals were sent to a Select House committee, Madison’s 
original proposal was modified to read that “no religion shall be established
by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed.”387  On August
15, 1789, Madison offered his understanding of the new proposal to mean
“that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation 
of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to 
their conscience.”388 Madison’s commentary on a proposal that retained
his original language on “the equal rights of conscience” again reinforced
his commitment to neutrality as a way to protect minorities, religious liberties,
and the sanctity of governmental and religious spheres. 
On August 20, 1789, the House adopted language by Representative Fisher 
Ames for the amendment before sending it to the Senate.389  This amendment 
retained Madison’s neutrality language, and it read, “Congress shall make 
no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to 
infringe the rights of conscience.”390  Ultimately, after many iterations of
the proposed amendment in the Senate, as well as a House rejection of the 
Senate’s version, a joint conference committee was held that produced the 
final text of the Establishment Clause.391  While Madison’s express language
of the equal rights of conscience did not survive this final amendment, the 
384. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 375, at 457. 
385. Id. 
386. Id.
 387. Id. at 757. 
388. Id. at 758. 
389. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 613 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing
the modifications to the proposed amendment). 
390. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 375, at 796. 
391. Lee, 505 U.S. at 613–14 (Souter, J., concurring) (outlining the Establishment 
Clause’s legislative history). 
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neutrality of Madison’s initial proposals and his vision of the proper rights 
and liberties of the American people remained at the heart of the balance
between both Religion Clauses.392 
Based on this history of Madison and his understanding of the intent of 
the establishment provision of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has 
applied a proper constitutional approach in embracing Madisonian neutrality
in this line of cases. This fidelity to Madisonian neutrality originated in 
Everson, where “the Court stated in clear and unequivocal terms that the
Establishment Clause required an absolute neutrality on the part of 
government, both as between particular religions and as between religion 
and nonreligion.”393  In doing so, Everson reaffirmed Madisonian neutrality 
as the guiding force for the predominant goals of the Establishment Clause:
avoidance of divisiveness of the people and protection of the minority
from majoritarian compulsion when religion and government intertwined;394 
protection of all people’s conscientious and religious liberties;395 and 
maintenance of the protections for each sphere of church and state from 
degradation by the other to preserve their distinct authority, value, and 
meaning.396  Each of these aims was designed to be safeguarded by a 
392. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Agora, Dignity, and Discrimination: On the 
Constitutional Shortcomings of “Conscience” Laws That Promote Inequality in the Public 
Marketplace, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1221, 1255 (2017) (discussing how Madison’s 
belief in the importance of religious conscience is evident in the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses).
393. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Improbability of Religion Clause Theory, 27 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1233, 1240 (1997). 
394. See Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 30, at 1058 
(including “avoiding the political strife that might result if religion and politics were
intertwined” as a predominant goal of the Establishment Clause); Blasi, supra note 382, at 
788–89 (discussing how Madison’s “deepest concern was with the tyranny of the majority” 
and how that concern was central in his views on the “subject of church and state”); Corbin, 
supra note 76, at 647 (discussing Madison’s views of “religious assessments as a first step
toward the persecution and subordination of religious minorities”).
395. See Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 30, at 1058 
(including “protecting religious freedom of choice” as a predominant goal of the Establishment 
Clause); James D. Nelson, Corporate Disestablishment, 105 VA. L. REV. 595, 628 (2019)
(discussing the Court’s freedom of conscience Establishment Clause analysis in school 
law cases). 
396. See Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 30, at 1058 
(including “insuring the integrity of both church and state by immunizing each from 
contamination by the other” as a predominant goal of the Establishment Clause); Corbin, 
supra note 76, at 648 (“Madison thought government-supported religion would corrupt 
and degrade its beneficiaries . . . .”); Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: 
Some Causes of the Recent Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 906 (2001) (identifying
the reduction of “civic/religious tensions and minimiz[ing] governmental intrusions into 
religious matters” as “objectives that help maintain the separate spheres of church and state 
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vigilant judiciary.  By employing Madisonian neutrality as the basis for 
its analysis in the religious activities in public schools cases, the Court has 
properly realized these three objectives of the Establishment Clause to 
create a constitutionally correct thicket that reflects the guiding intent of
the First Amendment. 
IV. A RECLAMATION OF THICKET THEORY IN EDUCATIONAL 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
INVOLVING RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The pejoration of thicket theory in educational Establishment Clause
jurisprudence needs reclamation. The identification of the unified fidelity 
to Madisonian neutrality at the core of the Court’s cases involving religious
activities in public schools allows for this reclamation as a constitutionally 
correct and net positive theory.  This new thicket theory reveals that by
maintaining adherence to Madisonian neutrality, the Court has decided
these cases in a way that has produced the primary results the Framers had
intended the Establishment Clause would achieve. 
Specifically, this theory reveals a thicket of beneficial safeguarding for 
all American schoolchildren, which aligns with the Court’s precedent on 
the special constitutional considerations for this group and for the setting 
of American public schools.  This result also aligns with Madison’s intent
that the inherent neutrality in the Establishment Clause would serve to 
tamper division and would protect minorities from religious compulsion
by majority forces.  It is a thicket that safeguards the freedom of conscience
of American schoolchildren, no matter their religious beliefs, while balancing
respect for their autonomy to engage in constitutionally protected religious 
practices. This result aligns with Madison’s intent that the neutrality of the 
Establishment Clause would extend to protect the religious and conscientious
liberties of the people. Finally, this thicket has preserved the teaching of 
actual democratic principles within American public schools through the 
Court’s vigilant and constitutionally correct application of the Establishment
Clause. This result aligns with Madison’s intent that the Establishment 
so sought after by the Establishment Clause”); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, 
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1239 (2010) (“[O]ne of the goals of the 
Establishment Clause is to preserve distinctive spheres of meaning, value, and authority
for [religion and government].”). 
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Clause maintain protections for each sphere of church and state from 
degradation by the other and that the judiciary act as guardian of these 
protections.  Ultimately, this new thicket theory demonstrates that this case 
law is constitutionally aligned, recognizant of the special environment of 
American public schools, properly protective of the religious and conscientious 
liberties of the impressionable constitutional constituency of children as a 
political minority, and pedagogically demonstrative of the civics education 
that should be imparted to this group. 
A. This Thicket Protects the Political Minority of American 
Public Schoolchildren from Divisive Forces of  
State-Established Religion 
The Court has stated that its religious activities in public schools 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence implements Madisonian neutrality
because of the special environment of the public school and the special 
constitutional constituency of American public schoolchildren.  In Edwards, 
the Court noted the required invalidation of multiple types of religious 
activities in public schools based on this special analysis: 
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the 
Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.  Families entrust 
public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the 
understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious
views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family.  Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is 
involuntary. . . . The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory 
attendance requirements, and because of the students’ emulation of teachers as 
role models and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure. . . . “In no activity 
of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools[.]”397 
Throughout these religion education precedents, the Court has worked to 
protect K-12 students from these divisive forces.
Here, the Court has appropriately decided these cases in a way that has 
demonstrated that “[t]he First Amendment is not a majority rule”398 and 
that has aligned with Madison’s view of the original intent of the 
397. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)). 
398. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 582 (2014); see also Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (“While in some societies the wishes of the majority
might prevail, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is addressed to this 
contingency and rejects the balance urged upon us.”). 
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Establishment Clause.399  In  Santa Fe Independent School District, the 
Court determined that the state’s majoritarian voting mechanism to elect 
a student speaker to deliver a prayer at school football games unconstitutionally 
“undermines the essential protection of minority viewpoints[,] . . . encourages 
divisiveness along religious lines[,] and threatens the imposition of coercion 
upon those students not desiring to participate in a religious exercise.”400 
In Engel, the Court also emphasized the inherent unconstitutionality of 
school prayer practices because of their “indirect coercive pressure upon 
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion.”401 
By implementing Madisonian neutrality in this case law, the only thicket
that has been created by the Court’s jurisprudence is one that appropriately
protects the school environment and the schoolchildren therein from the
divisive, harmful forces against minority groups that Madison sought to
have the Bill of Rights eliminate.402 
To protect public schools from injurious division along religious lines, 
the Court has acted in accordance with the Framers’ intent by delineating
these spaces as special ones for Establishment Clause analysis.403 In Lee, the 
Court acknowledged that the delicate, fact-sensitive nature of its Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence requires it to “distinguish the public school context.”404 
This distinct analysis entails “special sensitivity [to] the Establishment Clause 
problems that result when religious observances are moved into the public
schools.”405  This heightened judicial scrutiny has resulted in the Court’s
indubitable antecedent that “the First Amendment does not permit the State
to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or 
399. See J. Woodford Howard, Jr., The Robe and the Cloth: The Supreme Court and 
Religion in the United States, 7 J.L. & POL. 481, 489 (1991) (“Madison, [by] accenting
civil peace and minority rights, construe[d] the establishment clause broadly in order to
segregate private religion and public authority into autonomous spheres.”). 
400.  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000). 
401.  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
402. See Kurt T. Lash, The Status of Constitutional Religious Liberty at the End of 
the Millennium, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 2, 4 (1998) (discussing Madison’s view of religious 
establishment “as a divisive and potentially dangerous force in public affairs”). 
403. See Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance 
of the School Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945, 993 (2011) (discussing how the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has reflected the central role that public schools 
play in American democracy).
404.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992). 
405. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 287 (1990) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987)). 
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prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma,”406 which appropriately
recognizes the pedagogical environment of K-12 schools.  Considering
Madison’s constitutional concerns about curbing majoritarian tyranny, the 
Epperson Court stated that another one of these fundamental freedom 
antecedents is that “the First Amendment ‘does not tolerate laws that cast 
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.’”407  Consequently, the Court has
frequently affirmed the special importance of protecting religious liberty 
in public schools.408 This repeated recognition of the special school setting
has resulted in the creation of a protective “schools are different” ideology
for Establishment Clause analysis.409 
Within this ideology, the Court’s awareness of the special nature of the 
school environment dovetails with its constitutionally cautious treatment
of schoolchildren, who are a paradigmatic American political minority.410 
In implementing the Madisonian neutrality balance that was at the core of 
Everson, this Establishment Clause school law reflects the Court’s intent 
to provide specific safeguards to the political minority group of schoolchildren 
in general and to the nonreligious or religious minority schoolchildren in 
the special schoolhouse environment411 —a minority within a minority 
group of the American populace.412 This treatment is merited by the 
406.  Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968). 
407. Id. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
408. Strossen, supra note 46, at 608 (discussing the Court’s repeated acknowledgment of 
this important principle).
409. Ironically, this Establishment Clause “schools are different” ideology is markedly
different from the Court’s rights-based school law jurisprudence “schools are different” ideology 
that has been employed in a harmful way to strip away students’ First Amendment speech 
rights and Fourth Amendment privacy rights. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (“Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere . . . .”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 112, 134–35 (2004) (arguing
that the Court has almost completely decimated students’ First and Fourth Amendment
rights); Amanda Harmon Cooley, An Efficacy Examination and Constitutional Critique of 
School Shaming, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 342, 366 (2018) (discussing the Court’s increasing
circumscription of students’ constitutional rights under the First and Fourth Amendment
through the application of a “schools are different” ideology). 
410. See Laura J. Rees, Comment, “No (Christian) Child Left Behind”: The Supreme 
Court’s Jurisprudence in Establishment Clause Cases Involving Schoolchildren, 42 HOUS. 
L. REV. 197, 235 n.263 (2005) (highlighting schoolchildren as a minority group that merits 
special protection in Establishment Clause analysis).
411. See Esbeck, supra note 86, at 599 n.457 (“[E]nforcement of the Establishment 
Clause has the consequence of protecting . . . the right of conscience to be free of government- 
imposed religion even for those who subscribe to no religion.”). 
412. See Ruti G. Teitel, Postmodernist Architectures in the Law of Religion, 1993 
BYU L. REV. 97, 109 n.44 (discussing a school law argument that characterizes non-praying
K-12 students as “a political minority”). 
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“heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle 
coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.”413 
Any religious doctrine inculcation within schools has a magnified impact
due to the impressionability of K-12 students.414  Given their stage of 
cognitive development,415 schoolchildren, unlike mature adults,416 are “‘readily
susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer pressure.’”417 Because of 
this susceptibility to peer pressure and schoolchildren’s desire to emulate 
school officials as role models,418 the state has a tremendous amount of 
authority to wield coercive majoritarian power over public school students.419 
The Court has specifically stated that “The symbolism of a union between
church and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose 
experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of 
environment as much as of free and voluntary choice.”420  Students’ vulnerability 
becomes acute when they are subject to “inculcation of orthodoxy in the
guise of pedagogy.”421  Therefore, the Court has used this jurisprudence
to protect all schoolchildren from the divisive forces that can result from
Establishment Clause violations within the school environment in a way
that properly reflects the Framers’ intent. 
413.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
414.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). 
415. See Marty Beyer, Developmentally-Sound Practice in Family and Juvenile 
Court, 6 NEV. L.J. 1215, 1218 (2006) (“Young children’s cognitive development is intricately 
connected with their social and emotional functioning.” (quoting Alicia F. Lieberman & 
Patricia Van Horn, Assessment and Treatment of Young Children Exposed to Traumatic 
Events, in YOUNG CHILDREN AND TRAUMA: INTERVENTION AND TREATMENT 111, 115 (Joy 
Osofsky ed., 2004))); Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1315, 1323 n.45 (1995) (providing a comprehensive citation to sources 
discussing the cognitive development of children).
416. See Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh and Sectarian 
Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1032 (2011) (discussing how 
adults are “assumed capable of warding off the dual threats of religious indoctrination and 
peer pressure”).
417.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 
463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)). 
418.  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987). 
419. See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Duty of Public
Schools to Limit Student-Proposed Graduation Prayers, 74 NEB. L. REV. 411, 417 (1995)
(“[S]chool prayer is the state’s implicit promotion of majoritarian beliefs . . . .”). 
420. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). 
421.  Cole v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 350 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 (D. Me. 2004). 
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In addition to protection of the political minority group of all schoolchildren, 
the Court has used this area of jurisprudence to shelter the minority of the 
minority group—nonadherent K-12 students.422  The Court emphasized in 
Lee that schoolchildren who do not ascribe to the belief of a state school 
religious exercise require special protection: “What to most believers may
seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect 
their religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever
or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to 
enforce a religious orthodoxy.”423  Resistance essentially becomes futile
to the schoolchildren in this highly controlled, highly coercive environment, 
in which minority students are “left with no alternative but to submit.”424 
Consequently, the Court has been appropriately concerned with school
religious activities as local and state school officials “inevitably mold young 
minds with the instruction and values inculcation of the public schools.”425 
The state control that inheres in public school environments elevates the 
potential for harmful division and harm to minorities, and minorities of 
minorities,426 in direct conflict with the intent of the Establishment Clause.427 
And it is this phenomenon that “suffices to make [any such school] religious 
exercise a First Amendment violation.”428 Therefore, the Court has taken 
corrective steps to invalidate any religious exercise in public schools that
tips the balance of Madisonian neutrality in an effort to protect a vulnerable
group, which aligns with the Framers’ intent to have the Establishment 
Clause shield minorities from state religious compulsion. 
To avoid harmful and unconstitutional establishment of religion in the 
public schools, the Court has employed Madisonian neutrality to safeguard 
K-12 students. In doing so, the Court has stressed the need to avoid that
“crucial symbolic link between government and religion, thereby enlisting— 
422. See Hillel Y. Levin, Allan J. Jacobs & Kavita Shah Arora, To Accommodate or 
Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the State Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of 
Children and Third Parties?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 963 (2016) (noting that religious 
minority groups and children “are already underrepresented and under-protected in the 
political arena”).
423.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
424. Id. at 597. 
425. Amanda Harmon Cooley, Inculcating Suppression, 107 GEO. L.J. 365, 394 (2019). 
426. See Hillel Y. Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1617, 1621–24 (2015) (discussing how American institutions often do not 
adequately protect minority groups). 
427. See Drimmer, supra note 419, at 415, 417–18 (“Thus, the pressure inherent in
school prayer both inflicts a state-created ‘status harm’ by alienating nonadherents, and induces
religious conformity in children, who are particularly susceptible to such pressures.”).
428. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. 
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at least in the eyes of impressionable youngsters—the powers of government 
to the support of the religious denomination operating the school.”429 By
recognizing the tipping of the Madisonian neutrality scale towards aiding 
religion and towards Establishment Clause violations in the cases involving 
religious activities in public schools, the Court has properly acknowledged 
the special circumstances of constitutional analysis within the schoolhouse 
environment as applied to the K-12 students within it.  Through this approach, 
the Court has created an appropriately protective thicket for the special
constitutional constituency of American public schoolchildren. 
B. This Thicket Safeguards All Schoolchildren’s Religious and 
Conscientious Liberties 
By applying Madisonian neutrality in its Establishment Clause cases 
dealing with religious activities in public schools, the Court has created a 
protective thicket that safeguards all children’s beliefs with a balance
between conscientious and religious liberties and constitutional free exercise.430 
This is in express alignment with the objective of the Framers in drafting 
and adopting the First Amendment.431  In articulating this conception of
neutrality that was an original objective of the Establishment Clause, Madison 
argued in his Memorial and Remonstrance for a preservation of all liberties
of conscience in order to guard against division and preserve religion and 
government.432  Similarly, in his first proposed Bill of Rights, Madison 
advocated for a provision that “the full and equal rights of conscience 
[shall not] be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”433  This balance 
of neutrality was reflected in Everson, where the Court stated the First 
429. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). 
430. See generally Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the 
Free Exercise Clauses of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division 
v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017, 1027 (1994) (defining Madisonian neutrality as neutrality 
that “protects all beliefs and conduct unless the preservation of equal liberty and the existence
of the state are manifestly endangered” (citing Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of 
Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 BYU L. REV. 7, 26–27)). 
431. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985) (“[T]he Court has identified the 
individual’s freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the
First Amendment.”)
432. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947) (citing MADISON, supra note 123, at 
184).
433. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 375, at 451. 
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Amendment was adopted to ensure that “[s]tate power is no more to be 
used so as to [impede] religions than it is to favor them.”434 
The Court’s usage of Madisonian neutrality in these cases reflects the
Establishment Clause’s status as “an equal liberty provision[.]”435  It also 
demonstrates the Lockean liberty of conscience, which was at the core of 
Madison’s writings and profoundly influential on the Founders.436  By assuring
conscientious and religious liberty of all students and by safeguarding K-
12 students’ free exercise rights, this jurisprudence properly balances all 
schoolchildren’s beliefs. The Court explicitly recognized this balance in 
Wallace: 
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of a broader concept of individual freedom of mind, so also the
individual’s freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to 
refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. . . . But when the 
underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court has
unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by
the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at 
all.  This conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the
individual’s freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious 
beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by the
faithful, and from recognition of the fact that the political interest in forestalling
intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian sects—or even intolerance 
among “religions”—to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain.437 
What has been vital to this liberty of conscience aspect of the thicket of 
school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been an avoidance of 
the slippery slope that can result from labeling state religious practices 
in schools as minor encroachments or innocuous exercises.438  Claimed de 
minimis Establishment Clause violations in this school law are still 
Establishment Clause violations.439  The Court has stated that “it is no defense 
434. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
435. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 568 (1991). 
436. See Feldman, supra note 30, at 383 (discussing Madison’s derivation of ideas 
about neutrality and liberty of conscience from John Locke); Tara Smith, What Good Is 
Religious Freedom? Locke, Rand, and the Non-Religious Case for Respecting It, 69 ARK. 
L. REV. 943, 974 (2017) (discussing Locke’s influence on the Founders in their conceptions of
religious liberty).
437.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–54 (1985). 
438. See Epstein, supra note 123, at 2088–89 (cautioning against “slippery slope” 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
439. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 59, 91 & n.160 (2017) (“Steven G. Gey argues strongly that there are no trivial
constitutional violations.” (citing Steven G. Gey, “Under God,” the Pledge of Allegiance, 
and Other Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865 (2003))). 
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to urge that [these] religious practices here may be relatively minor 
encroachments on the First Amendment.”440 In Engel, the Court expressly 
quoted Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance to knock down the state’s 
attempt to classify “the governmental endorsement of [school] prayer [as] 
relatively insignificant when compared to the governmental encroachments
upon religion which were commonplace 200 years ago.”441 
Similarly, the Court has correctly found that the brevity of a religious 
practice in public schools also cannot be the constitutional basis for evading
a violation of the Establishment Clause.442 In Engel, the Court used the words 
of “Madison, the author of the First Amendment[,]” to respond to the belief 
that the challenged school prayer was “so brief and general there can be
no danger to religious freedom in its governmental establishment”443: 
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which
can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support
of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment 
in all cases whatsoever?444 
The Court also rejected a brevity defense in Lee, where the Court recognized 
that the constitutional injury that resulted from students’ participation in a 
school graduation religious prayer exercise extended beyond the short time 
that it took for the prayers to take place.445 As the Court emphasized in 
Wallace, the importance of “the established principle that the government
must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion” means that
the Court cannot treat school law religion cases as brief religious exercises 
in “inconsequential case[s] involving nothing more than a few words of 
symbolic speech on behalf of the political majority.”446 
Through finding that state encroachments on students’ conscientious 
choices by forcing compulsion or by requiring nonparticipation violates 
440. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); see also Stone v. Graham, 
449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (rejecting a “minor encroachment” defense to a claimed Establishment 
Clause violation (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225)). 
441.  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). 
442. See Epstein, supra note 123, at 2133 (discussing the Court’s rejection of brevity 
assertions to defend against school law Establishment Clause violations). 
443. Engel, 370 U.S. at 436. 
444. Id. (quoting MADISON, supra note 123, at 185–86). 
445. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992). 
446.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985). 
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Madisonian neutrality, the Court has rejected any type of proffered forced
choice or forfeiture defense to an Establishment Clause violation.  The 
undue influence created by state-sponsored religious activities in public 
schools conflicts with the constitutional “concern for individual autonomy[,]” 
in that the “[g]overnment violates that principle whenever it interferes
with individual choice around religion by influencing individual choice in
favor of a particular religion, all religion, or no religion.”447  This is magnified 
when this pressure is asserted on impressionable schoolchildren.448  Quite 
rightly, the Court has held that the State cannot “exact religious conformity 
from a student as the price of attending” core school events and maintain 
within the bounds of the Constitution.449  As the Court concluded this point 
in Lee, “[t]his is the calculus the Constitution commands.”450 Consequently, 
forced forfeiture of students’ liberties to avoid a religious practice in the
public schools will not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny.451  This was 
made clear by the Court in Lee: 
The Government’s argument gives insufficient recognition to the real conflict of
conscience faced by the young student.  The essence of the Government’s position
is that with regard to a civic, social occasion of this importance it is the objector,
not the majority, who must take unilateral and private action to avoid compromising 
religious scruples, hereby electing to miss the graduation exercise.  This turns 
conventional First Amendment analysis on its head.  It is a tenet of the First 
Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her 
rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious
practice. To say that a student must remain apart from the ceremony at the opening
invocation and closing benediction is to risk compelling conformity in an environment 
analogous to the classroom setting, where we have said the risk of compulsion is 
especially high.452 
447. Nelson Tebbe, The End of Religious Freedom: What Is at Stake?, 41 PEPP. L. 
REV. 963, 973–74 (2014) (citing 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 9 (2008)). 
448. See Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 
600 n.169 (2005) (discussing the Court’s repeated acknowledgments within its school law
Establishment Clause jurisprudence “that government involvement with religion ‘can have 
a magnified impact on impressionable young minds’” (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997))).
449. Lee, 505 U.S. at 596. 
450. Id. 
451. See id. at 595 (“[A] student is not free to absent herself from the graduation
exercise in any real sense of the term ‘voluntary,’ for absence would require forfeiture
of those intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all her
high school years.”). 
452. Id. at 596. 
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By rejecting these de minimis, brevity, and forfeiture defenses, the Court 
has properly ensured protection of the conscientious and religious liberties 
of all schoolchildren in accordance with the original intent of the Framers 
in adopting the Establishment Clause. 
Commensurately, in implementing Madisonian neutrality, the Court’s 
case law in this area has recognized and reaffirmed how this jurisprudence 
is not an impingement on individual students’ free exercise rights.453  In 
Schempp, the Court made clear that Madisonian neutrality, “which does
not permit a State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of 
the majority of those affected,” does not “collide[] with the majority’s right 
to free exercise of religion.”454  The liberty balance of these cases just provides
that the protection of these free exercise rights cannot result from the majority’s
use of State mechanisms to practice and enforce those beliefs.455 
Therefore, the Court’s constitutionally aligned Establishment Clause 
doctrine in education law is not antireligious.456  In fact, it provides protection
of religion by standing “as an expression of principle on the part of the 
Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too 
holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”457 By
ensuring that students’ free exercise rights are maintained through a vigilant
enforcement of the Establishment Clause, the Court has made clear that this 
clause is not a sword that harms religion. Instead, it is a shield that protects
religion as was originally envisaged by Madison, who often argued that his 
conception of neutrality “shielded religious liberty from civil authority.”458 
The Court has emphasized this alignment by noting that “James Madison, 
the principal author of the Bill of Rights, did not rest his opposition to a
religious establishment on the sole ground of its effect on the minority.”459 
Instead, a primary ground for his original proposal for the Bill of Rights 
453. See Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability of Religious 
Inequality, 1996 BYU L. REV. 569, 573 (1996) (discussing students’ ability to engage in 
constitutionally permissible religious practices at school). 
454.  Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225–26 (1963). 
455. See id. at 226. 
456. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 598 (stating that the Court “express[es] no hostility to” religion 
in these school law cases).
457. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962) (quoting MADISON, supra note 123, at 
187).
458. John J. Infranca, (Communal) Life, (Religious) Liberty, and Property, 2017 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 481, 497–98 (citing JAMES MADISON, DETACHED MEMORANDA (1817)). 
459. Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. 
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was the perspective that “‘experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical 
establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion,
have had a contrary operation.’”460  Like Madison, the Court in this jurisprudence 
has recognized “through bitter experience that it is not within the power 
of government to invade that citadel [of religion], whether its purpose or 
effect be to aid or oppose.”461  Consequently, the Court has determined
in these religious exercises in public schools cases that “the State [must
be] firmly committed to a position of neutrality” in order to comply with
the dictates of the First Amendment.462 
Through a consistent application of Madisonian neutrality, the Court 
has created a thicket of school law Establishment Clause cases involving
religious activities in schools that creates a constitutional balance of religious
liberty and liberty of conscience with free exercise for all schoolchildren.463 
This protection is beneficial on all sides for “[a] state-created orthodoxy 
puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole 
assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.”464  This school law neutrality 
is meant to guarantee the right of individual conscience against compulsion, to 
protect the integrity of religion against the corrosion of secular support, and to 
preserve the unity of political society against the implied exclusion of the less 
favored and the antagonism of controversy over public support for religious causes.465 
Therefore, the Court’s fidelity to Madisonian neutrality that composes this 
thicket of jurisprudence is properly reflective of one of the core intended 
purposes of the Establishment Clause. 
C. This Thicket Conveys a Positive Jurisprudential Lesson that 
Protects the Spheres of Religion and Government 
By incorporating Madisonian neutrality into its decision-making in cases 
involving religious activities in public schools, the Court has fulfilled the 
Framers’ goal for the Establishment Clause to protect the inviolability of 
460. Id. (quoting MADISON, supra note 123, at 301). 
461.  Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). 
462. Id.
 463. See Perry Dane, Master Metaphors and Double-Coding in the Encounters of 
Religion and State, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 100 (2016) (“[N]eutrality-talk is an effective
bridge between the general conventions of constitutional discourse and the distinctive claims of
religion.”).
464. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592. 
465.  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the spheres of religion and government.466  The Court’s precedents in this
area have also had a pedagogical effect in a meta sense—these school law 
decisions, which preserve both church and state from degradation by the 
other, have illustrated to the students and educators impacted by these
decisions how the First Amendment was designed by the Framers to function. 
Through this approach, the Court has imparted lessons about civic democratic 
principles to K-12 students by preserving conscientious liberties in schools,
which are the educative spaces for civic values inculcation in those
children.467  In doing so, the Court has acted in alignment with Madison’s
call for the judiciary to act as the guardian of the liberties that the 
Establishment Clause was designed to protect.468 
Throughout Madison’s writings and original proposal for the Bill of 
Rights, he argued that one of the goals of disestablishment was to preserve
the spheres of religion and government.  For Madison, the state sponsorship
of religious exercises “corrupted religion itself, and thus corrupted religion’s 
capacity for generating true virtue.”469 Madison strongly believed that
“religion [and government] will both exist in greater purity, the less they 
are mixed together.”470  This was the basis for the neutrality that he urged 
in the evaluation of religious activities in governmental enterprises.  And 
this is the neutrality that the Court has incorporated into its cases involving 
466. See Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates:
Why the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause Are Stronger When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 
1707 (2011) (“[B]ecause of the Establishment Clause[, religion] is much more independent
of government than its secular counterparts.”). 
467. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy
and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny.”). 
468. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1311, 1394–95 (1997) (discussing Madison’s intent that the federal courts safeguard the
protections within the Bill of Rights). 
469. Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 
TUL. L. REV. 87, 121 (1992) (citing JAMES MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance, in 
SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 5, 9–10 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. 
ed. 1981)). 
470. JAMES MADISON, Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 
1822), reprinted in  JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 82, 83 (Robert S. Alley ed., 
1985). 
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religious exercises in public schools.471 Through the creation of this 
constitutionally correct thicket, the Court has worked in alignment with 
the Establishment Clause’s “first and most immediate purpose [that] rested 
on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and to degrade religion.”472 
The Court’s incorporation of Madisonian neutrality is particularly
appropriate because public schools have been deemed the primary places 
for civic values education of American children.473  Public schools have 
long played a central role in American democracy.474  For over 200 years, 
American public schools have been acknowledged as “sites for the creation 
of American identity” through their inculcation of students with core American
values and civic democratic principles.475 In West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, the Court emphasized that public schools “are
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free 
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our 
government as mere platitudes.”476  Consequently, “the unique role schools 
play in forming moral character” of schoolchildren gives rise to appropriately
heightened judicial scrutiny of the Establishment Clause in school law 
cases. 477
By deciding these cases in alignment with Madisonian neutrality, the
Court has taught American schoolchildren how the judiciary should safeguard 
religion and government,478 as these are some of “the most cherished features 
471. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 (“For the First Amendment rests upon the premise 
that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left
free from the other within its respective sphere.”). 
472.  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
473. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 681 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“[O]ne of the purposes of public schools was to promote democracy and a more egalitarian 
culture . . . .”).
474. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The public school is in most respects the cradle of our democracy.”), overruled in part 
by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
475. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 70 (2005) (discussing the importance of American 
public schools since the mid-1800s). 
476.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
477. Michele Estrin Gilman, “Charitable Choice” and the Accountability Challenge: 
Reconciling the Need for Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 799, 871 (2002). 
478. See Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. 
REV. 71, 97–98 (2010) (discussing how many of the Court’s decisions have been driven 
by its beliefs about the significance of education in public schools). 
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of our constitutional system.”479  In addition to the direct effect of this case 
law on students, these decisions have educated educators and educational 
policymakers, whose decisions may not align with the key purposes of the
First Amendment and who may not be providing the types of civic education
that the Court is offering.480  Such religion-education precedents have supported
all school constituencies to engage with the broader American narrative 
of creating educative spaces for young people to develop into democratic 
citizens.481 
The Court has acknowledged the pedagogical impact of this line of 
constitutional analysis, noting in Lee that the “timeless lesson” of the First 
Amendment “is that if citizens are subjected to state-sponsored religious 
exercises, the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere 
of inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people.”482 
By holding to a Madisonian neutrality line in these cases, the Court has 
set a stance that “has its roots in the Framers’ beliefs that the sacred practices 
of religious instruction and prayer were best left to be taught by private 
institutions, the family, and houses of worship, and not by the schools.”483 
At the same time, it has functioned “to keep out divisive forces . . . in 
[America’s public] schools, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what the 
Constitution sought to keep strictly apart.”484 
Throughout this category of school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
the Court has emphasized that “the vigilant protection of constitutional 
479. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795 (1973). 
480. See, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, City on A Hill: The Democratic Promise of Higher 
Education, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 73, 103 (2017) (discussing the “weaknesses in civic education 
at the elementary and secondary school level”). But see Lauren Maisel Goldsmith & James 
R. Dillon, The Hallowed Hope: The School Prayer Cases and Social Change, 59 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 409, 441 (2015) (“[E]mpirical studies show that most school districts, most of the 
time, have aimed to interpret the Court’s orders [in its school prayer decisions] in good
faith (if not generously) and to comply with their perceived legal obligations.”).
481. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the 
preservation of a democratic system of government.”); Osamudia R. James, Business as 
Usual: The Roberts Court’s Continued Neglect of Adequacy and Equity Concerns in American 
Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 793, 812 (2008) (discussing the Court’s characterization of 
education as vital to preserving democratic government).
482.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
483. Jeffrey E. Blivaiss, A Case for the Unconstitutionality of Student-Led Prayer at 
High School Graduation Ceremonies, 26 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 4 (2002). 
484. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948). 
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freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools.”485  The Court must continue to be vigilant in ensuring that the
state complies with these requirements of the Establishment Clause in the
operation of its public schools.486  These decisions must be viewed through
the lens of providing protection for K-12 students’ growth, because these
shielding school environments give students the tools to learn the basic 
parameters of civic life and to interrogate their views487—seeing where
they coincide and conflict with each other while learning what it means to
be an active participant in American democracy.488  Maintaining fidelity 
to Madisonian neutrality in the special circumstances of the school 
environment lays the predicate for the Court to lead the charge to assist
schoolchildren “to become self-fulfilling, self-sustaining adults who can
contribute to the civic community.”489  As a result of this jurisprudence,
these students can learn that, although the state can control many things in 
their lives,490 it cannot dictate matters of faith, religion, or disbelief.  This 
is the sine qua non of civic education.  It is this education that the Court 
has allowed through the protective thicket of its religious activities in 
public schools jurisprudence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It seems almost impossible to find a coherent theory within the Court’s 
entire Establishment Clause doctrine.491  As a result, there has been a 
485. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). 
486. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987) (noting the Court’s particular 
vigilance in this area).
487. See Cooley, supra note 425, at 372–73 (2019) (arguing that American public 
schools are the primary state force in educating children about civic virtues and democratic 
principles).
488. See Laura Rene McNeal, Hush Don’t Say a Word: Safeguarding Students’
Freedom of Expression in the Trump Era, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 296 (2019) (discussing
public schools’ role in preparing children for democratic participation); Steven D. Smith, 
Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, 
38 PEPP. L. REV. 945, 994 (2011) (“[C]ore democratic conceptions and values are supposed 
to be inculcated in the rising generation [in public schools].”). 
489. Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making 
Sense of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 350 (1994). 
490. See Amanda Harmon Cooley, Controlling Students and Teachers: The Increasing
Constriction of Constitutional Rights in Public Education, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 235, 237– 
38 (2014) (discussing the extensive control schools exercise over students’ speech and privacy
interests).
491. See Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
693, 693 (1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made a mess of this area . . . .”); John M. 
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tremendous amount of critical scholarship regarding the constitutional 
religion clauses,492 with diametrically opposed perspectives from learned
academics, jurists, and experts on the same subjects.493  Because of the 
complexities and difficulties of these cases,494 the Court has stated that one 
fixed Establishment Clause jurisprudential rule or test is impossible.495 
Likewise, the evolution of the Court’s establishment doctrine in the 
difficult area of education has been inconsistent.496  School law cases have 
produced a variety of tests, touchstones, analyses, and applications.497 The 
Bickers, False Facts and Holy War: How the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
Cases Fuel Religious Conflict, 51 IND. L. REV. 305, 307 & n.3 (2018) (discussing scholarly 
Establishment Clause criticism); Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and 
Religious Expression in Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 
110 W. VA. L. REV. 315, 315 (2007) (deeming this doctrine “a muddled mess”); Eisgruber 
& Sager, supra note 15, at 578 (labeling this jurisprudence “not at all reassuring[,] . . . relatively 
theory-free, [and] . . . a complete hash”); Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment 
Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2007) (discussing scholarly and judicial agreement about
this doctrine being “a chaotic and contradictory mess”). 
492. See, e.g., Roald Mykkeltvedt, Tension Between the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment: Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 56 TENN. L. REV. 693, 693–94 
(1989) (arguing that the Court has failed to create a rational body of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence).
493. See Alberto B. Lopez, Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette’s Imbalance 
of Free Speech and Establishment, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 179 (2003) (discussing the 
variety of scholarly interpretations of the meaning of the Establishment Clause); Nelson 
Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363, 372 (2015)
(discussing cross-critiques of Establishment Clause scholarship, labeling the other side as 
“not just eclectic but erratic”).
494. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 
(1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (articulating the difficulties of these cases). 
495. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (“In each case, the inquiry
calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause . . . 
is not a precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application.”); William
J. Dobosh, Jr., Coercion in the Ranks: The Establishment Clause Implications of Chaplain-
Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1499 (discussing the
Court’s repeated acknowledgement of the lack of a singular test for Establishment Clause 
analysis).
496. See Kevin T. Baine, Education Litigation: Prospects for Change, 35 CATH. 
LAW. 283, 287 (1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has decided a series of [Establishment Clause]
education cases that, read together, simply defy comprehension.”).
497. See Gey, supra note 439, at 1883 (“The problem is not that the Supreme Court 
has failed to articulate a standard for deciding Establishment Clause cases; the problem is
that the Court has articulated too many standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases.”); 
Edward A. Liva, Even Silence Has No Prayer: The Third Circuit Sacks Coach’s Silent 
Team Prayer in Borden v. School District of East Brunswick, 54 VILL. L. REV. 801, 803, 
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Court’s educational Establishment Clause jurisprudence has also produced 
four major categories of cases just within this one subset of its overall 
Establishment Clause body of case law: 1) substantive religious activities in 
public schools cases; 2) substantive governmental assistance to nonpublic, 
sectarian schools cases; 3) substantive equal access cases; and 4) justiciability 
and jurisdictional requirements cases.498  It is no wonder then that there is 
a perception that the Court’s education law Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
like all of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, is a thicket in the very
worst sense of the term.499 
However, when the religious activities in public schools cases are separated 
from the remainder of the Court’s inconsistent school law doctrine,500 a 
new version of thicket theory emerges that mirrors thickets in the natural
world. These thickets in nature often provide protection for young and 
vulnerable animal species from predators and other harms.501  The Court’s 
educational Establishment Clause jurisprudence involving religious activities
in public schools is this type of thicket, and it is one that is composed of
fidelity to Madisonian neutrality. No matter the tactical approach, the
constitutional neutrality in these cases adheres to the original objectives 
of the Framers in drafting the Establishment Clause—that the government 
806–07 (2009) (discussing the various tests the Court has used in its school prayer Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence); Louis J. Virelli III, Making Lemonade: A New Approach to Evaluating
Evolution Disclaimers Under the Establishment Clause, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423, 434 
(2006) (criticizing the variety of tests used by the Court in its public school evolution 
instruction cases).
498. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
499. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom 
Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672, 674 (1992) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s Religion Clause case law [is] confused, inconsistent, and incoherent.”). 
500. See, e.g., Laurence H. Winer & Nina J. Crimm, A Perspective on Suitable Latitude 
for Religious Establishments: Lessons from Contrasting the Student Educational Arena 
with the Adult Political Square, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 224 (2017) (arguing that the Court 
has “emasculated the Establishment Clause and ‘betray[ed] [James] Madison’s vision’” in 
its Establishment Clause cases analyzing government aid to religious education (quoting
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 168 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting))). 
501. See, e.g., JOHN C. DYES, NESTING BIRDS OF THE COASTAL ISLANDS: A NATURALIST’S 
YEAR ON GALVESTON BAY, at vi (1993) (depicting a prickly pear cactus thicket that 
provides protection of nesting birds’ eggs from predators); Coyotes 101, COYOTE SMARTS, 
https://www.coyotesmarts.org/coyotes101/ [https://perma.cc/SHP5-HMBS ] (discussing 
how many coyotes make their dens in dense thickets); David Graves, Plum Thickets Add 
Cover for Ground-Nesting Birds, Rabbits and Deer, ARK. GAME & FISH COMM’N (Apr. 24, 
2019), https://www.agfc.com/en/news/2019/04/24/plum-thickets-add-cover-for-ground-
nesting-birds-rabbits-and-deer/  [https://perma.cc/T2FW-ML4R] (discussing the importance
of thickets as protection for a variety of prey species from predators). 
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can neither aid nor inhibit religion.  This is an appropriate constitutional 
harnessing of the interplay of these mechanisms in our democracy.502 
Consequently, a thicket theory can be reclaimed through the identification
of this unified Framers’ fidelity and through the beneficial consequences 
of this case law.  The Court’s school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence
relating to religious activities in schools is not an incomprehensible thicket.503 
Instead, it is an intricate thicket composed of fidelity vines to Madison’s 
conception of neutrality, which aligns with the original purposes of the
Establishment Clause.  It is a thicket that has properly provided protection 
to a special constitutional constituency—impressionable American 
schoolchildren within the important constitutional arena of American 
public schools.  It is a thicket that safeguards the freedom of conscience
and religious liberty of all American schoolchildren, no matter their religious
or spiritual beliefs.  Finally, it is a thicket that sets a positive jurisprudential
precedent that teaches expansive actual civic democratic principles.  These 
educative benefits, which result from the Court’s proper stare decisis 
application of Madisonian neutrality, demonstrate that this is the proper
constitutional course for the difficult cases that will inevitably continue to 
arise in the future.504 
502. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1667, 1670 (2006) (“Those who crafted our Constitution believed that both authentic 
freedom and effective government could and should be secured . . . by harnessing, rather than 
homogenizing, the messiness of democracy.”).
503. See Harry G. Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony?  School Vouchers and the Future 
of the Race, 68 MO. L. REV. 559, 640 (2003). 
504. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Thinking 
Categorically: Lessons from Lamb’s Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (discussing the 
continued constitutional controversies that arise from the intersection of the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses in public schools). 
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